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Introduction and Purpose
Malnutrition is a driver of poverty. Reducing malnutrition is essential to achieving the World 
Bank’s goals of eliminating extreme poverty and enhancing shared prosperity. This compendium 
offers practical information on how to plan, implement, and monitor incentivized operations for 
improving nutrition results for World Bank client countries. For more detailed background in-
formation, see the World Bank report Incentivizing Nutrition: Incentive Mechanisms to Accelerate 
Improved Nutrition Outcomes.
Why nutrition?
• Good nutrition reduces mortality and breaks the intergenerational cycle of poverty
• Malnutrition is a driver of disparities
• Nutrition is a vital aspect of a country’s universal health coverage (UHC) policy 
• Good nutrition is the result of a combination of factors and dependent on multiple sectors
• Malnutrition is a barrier to achieving a range of sectoral development objectives
• Cost-effective nutrition-specific interventions are highly successful in improving nutrition
• Evidence based nutrition interventions consistently appear in economic analyses as a 
high investment priority 
• The right incentives are an important ingredient to successfully scaling up a country’s 
multisectoral nutrition plans 
• World Bank has extensive experience designing, implementing, and evaluating incentives 
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Well proven nutrition interventions exist and should be scaled up. In 2008 and 2013, The Lan-
cet, a leading medical journal, published two groundbreaking nutrition-focused issues reviewing 
the current evidence for effective interventions to reduce child and maternal malnutrition in 
developing countries. The list of recommended high impact interventions is included in Table 
1. They are all nutrition-specific interventions focused on the proximate causes of malnutrition.  
NUTRITION INTERVENTION WHAT DOES IT INVOLVE? WHY DOES IT MATTER?
PROMOTION OF  
BREASTFEEDING
• Community-based education and 
behavior change
Early breastfeeding reduces 
all-cause and infection related 
neonatal mortality by 44–45%
COMPLEMENTARY FEEDING
• Community-based education and 
behavior change
• Provision of complementary foods
Complementary feeding results in 
increased height and weight
MANAGEMENT OF SEVERE  
ACUTE MALNUTRITION
• Community-based therapeutic 
feeding using ready-to-use-foods
Provision of ready-to-use-foods 
leads to faster weight gain, improved 
recovery, and reduced mortality
VITAMIN A
SUPPLEMENTATION
• Provision of supplements
• Delivery through existing healthcare 
platform e.g., child health days
Vitamin A supplementation reduces  
all-cause and diarrhea related mortality
SALT IODIZATION
• Iodization of salt at point of 
processing
• Targeted to pregnant women
Salt iodization increases birth 




• Community education and behavior 
change
• Communications e.g., mass media
Handwashing with soap reduces 
the risk of diarrhea
THERAPEUTIC ZINC  
FOR DIARRHEA
• Access to zinc supplements for 
children 
• Delivery through existing antenatal 
care platforms
Zinc treatment for diarrhea leads to a 
46% reduction in all-cause mortality
IRON AND FOLIC ACID
• Provision of supplements to 
pregnant women 
• Delivery through existing antenatal 
care platforms 
Iron and folic acid supplementation 
for pregnant women leads 
to higher birth weight 
MULTIPLE MICRONUTRIENT  
POWDERS
• Provision of micronutrient powders 
to children 
• Demand generation including 
strategic communication   
Significant reductions in anemia
DEWORMING
• Delivery of deworming drugs
• School-based or through healthcare 
system
Treating children infected with 
worms increases weight
IRON FORTIFICATION OF STAPLES • Product fortification at point of  
processing e.g., flours
Iron fortification results in 41% 
reduction in the risks of anemia
Source: Children’s Investment Fund Foundation.
Table 1. High-Impact Nutrition-Specific Interventions
Financial incentive mechanisms are used to enhance nutrition results by motivating change. 
The incentive mechanisms are categorized by the levels at which they operate, i.e., government: 
national and sub-national, health facility, community, household / individual levels—see Figure 1. 
For each level, we document the following: a description of the incentive mechanism; the mecha-
nism’s potential strengths; the potential challenges; and examples of countries that have tried the 
instruments. Non-financial incentives to improve nutrition are also presented.
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What are incentive mechanisms?
In its simple form, an incentive is something that motivates an action. Incentive structures are 
a central feature of economics and are described as the interaction between a principal, who 
applies the incentive, and an agent, who receives the incentive. The basic tenet is that “higher 
incentives will lead to more effort and higher performance.”1  
Incentives can be classified into four categories:
• Financial incentives: when an agent can expect some form of material reward, 
e.g., money, in exchange for a particular behavior;2
• Moral incentives: when a choice is widely regarded as the “right thing to do,” 
or particularly respectable, or conversely, when the failure to act in a certain way is 
unacceptable. An individual acting on a moral incentive obtains in return a sense of 
self-esteem, approval or even admiration from his community, or guilt, condemnation or 
ostracism if s/he acts against a moral incentive.3 
• Coercive incentives: when failure to act a particular way results in physical force 
being used against the agent by others in the community.4 
• Natural of intrinsic incentives: this is a category of incen-
tives that are driven from the personality of the agent, such as curiosity, 
fear, the pursuit of truth, wanting to contribute to society, etc.5 
Financial incentives can have two kinds of effects: a direct price effect, which 
make the incentivized behavior more attractive, and an indirect psychologi-
cal effect. The psychological effect can reinforce the price effect but can also 
sometimes work in an opposite direction to the price effect and crowd out the 
incentivized behavior.6 
The World Development Report 2015 argues that much of economic policy 
relies on a model of human behavior that takes little account of human so-
ciality. Yet the fact that humans think socially “has enormous implications 
for decision making and behavior, and thus for development.”7 The report 
outlines the following four implications of human sociality on development 
interventions.
First, economic incentives are not necessarily the best or the only way to 
motivate individuals. The drive for status and social recognition means that 
in many situations, social incentives can be used alongside or even instead of 
economic incentives to elicit desired behaviors. Moreover, economic incen-
tives can both “crowd out” intrinsic motivations and “crowd in” social prefer-











1 U. Gneezy, S. Meier, and P. Rey-Biel. 2011. When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work to Modify Behavior. J Econ Perspect 25 
(4): 191.
2 K. Dalkir. 2013. Knowledge management in theory and practice. New York: Routledge.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 D.C. McClelland. 1987. Human Motivation. Cambridge University Press Archive.
6 Gneezy et al., 2011. 192.
7 World Bank. 2015. World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society, and Behavior. Washington, DC. 54.
Second, humans act as members of groups. Interventions that increase interactions or create 
groups among individuals who have a common interest in goals such as breastfeeding may fa-
cilitate the achievement of these objectives.
Third, there is a widespread willingness of individuals to cooperate in the pursuit of shared 
goals. Most people prefer to cooperate as long as others are cooperating. This implies that mak-
ing behavior more visible and “marketing” adherence to norms such as having men play an im-
portant role in child feeding practices may be a cost-effective means of increasing contributions 
to collective goods. 
Finally, human societies develop social norms as a means of coordinating and regulating be-
havior. Societies can get stuck in collective patterns of behavior that do not serve their interest. 
Since social norms are often taken for granted, socially appropriate behav-
iors by individuals can lead to suboptimal social outcomes. Norm change 
may sometimes be a necessary component of social change.8 
Incentives vary across cultures and over time because social incentive 
structures are established by different forms of social interactions that 
take place within cultural norms and expectations that vary geographi-
cally and over time. What is valued or is deemed unacceptable in one cul-
ture may not be perceived the same way in other cultures or within the 
same culture over time. We tend to perceive the world around us through 
mental models that reflect the shared understandings of our community.9 
For example, volunteerism by community health workers to improve nu-
trition may be valued—and therefore boost the worker’s self-esteem—in 
a country that recognizes that nutrition is a national development pri-
ority. In another setting where volunteerism is not as valued, or where 
wealth accumulation confers social status, and where malnutrition is not 
considered a social priority, financial incentives may be more effective or 
even necessary. Even for an individual, such as a community health work-
er, the relative importance of a certain type of incentive may change over 
the course of a lifetime, e.g., starting with the self-esteem related to the 
prestige of having been selected from the community, supplemented by 
intrinsic motivation and, over time, a potential gradual movement towards 
greater attention to financial incentives.
In this compendium, we focus primarily on financial incentive mech-
anisms, but we recommend that due attention also be given to non-fi-
nancial incentives, i.e., moral, coercive and natural / intrinsic incentives. 
Depending on the core constraints that are defined in the theory of change 
analysis,10 a mix of financial and non-financial incentives will need to be 
used to achieve results. Part II of this compendium includes a discussion 
of some of the non-financial incentives that may be considered in scaling 
up nutrition programs. That section is not meant to be a comprehensive 
review. It serves to remind the reader that a balance between financial and 
non-financial incentives is required. We recommend consulting the World 
Development Report 2015, which contains a rich discussion on this topic.11 
8 Ibid. 55.
9 Ibid. 62.
10 See C. Valters. 2015. Theories of Change; Time for a Radical Approach to Learning in Development. London, UK: Overseas 
Development Institute.
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Because a range of incentives act on an individual at the same time and because human be-
havior is complex, it is very difficult to predict the effect that a specific incentive will have over 
the short, medium and long term. This risk highlights the importance of establishing strong 
monitoring systems—which track the results to be achieved as well as potential unintended 
consequences of certain incentives, e.g., its effect on motivation and self-esteem of workers.  
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Financial Incentive Mechanisms  
Applied at Different Levels
The incentive mechanisms are categorized by the levels at which they operate, i.e., government: 
national and sub-national, health facility, community, household, and individual levels (see Fig-
ure 1). For each level, we document the following: (1) a description of the mechanism; (2) the 
mechanism’s potential strengths; (3) the potential challenges; and (4) examples of countries that 
have tried the instruments.
Figure 1. Financial Incentive Mechanisms Applied at Different Levels 
Source: Authors.
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  Government Level: National and Sub-National
• Development Policy Financing (DPF)
Definition
• DPF combines the objective of reducing a government’s fiscal deficit with sectoral 
or macro-level developmental objectives by incentivising policy reforms. Disburse-
ments are based on predetermined policy triggers which are linked to the govern-
ment completing reform actions.
• IDA / IBRD funds flow into the government budget and the country systems are 
used. The amount of IDA / IBRD financing is not necessarily linked to the cost of the 
reform.
• DPFs cannot be used to impose reforms without sufficient country ownership and 
commitment—an important prerequisite for success. 
• The World Bank does not prescribe activities or inputs to be financed from the IDA 
/ IBRD funds, which may be spent on anything as long as the agreed reforms are 
achieved—except a short negative list as may be agreed between the Word Bank and 
the government.
Potential Strengths 
• Can unblock policy constraints. DPFs could be useful to nutrition programs if the 
policy environment is the binding constraint to achieving nutrition outcomes, e.g., 
agricultural policies, food subsidies, gender policies, etc., and if strong government 
commitment exists (or could be developed) for specific reform measures to remove 
the constraint. Agriculture policies are closely linked to nutrition, and so are social 
safety net programs. A national policy on ensuring universal health coverage could 
have a beneficial impact on nutrition, if nutrition services are included in the benefits 
package. Food safety legislation, regulation of baby formula foods, and food fortifica-
tion with micronutrients are other relevant policy areas for nutrition. A DPF could 
facilitate moving such policies in the right direction.
• May generate greater ownership and sustainability. DPFs entail no micromanage-
ment by the World Bank in terms of activities carried out or expenditures incurred. 
The country’s own systems are used. Well-designed DPFs usually ensure that the 
incentivised reforms have strong national ownership and commitment. The benefits 
are therefore likely to be systemic and more sustainable. Sustainability is critical to 
nutrition, which is a long-term and continual objective.
• Potential to raise the profile of nutrition. Adding nutrition into a DPF could help 
raise the importance of nutrition, positioning it as a national development priority at 
the same level as other policy reforms included in the DPF.
• Attractive to governments. DPFs are quick disbursing and contribute to the coun-
try’s fiscal health and sector-specific goals. A DPF is attractive to ministries of fi-
nance, which typically are the World Bank’s counterparts in negotiating the World 
Bank’s country assistance. Adding a nutrition-related policy trigger to a DPF could be 
a smart strategy in an otherwise less than enthusiastic environment for stand-alone 
nutrition operations.
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Potential Challenges
• Does not address implementation challenges. DPFs are not the instrument of choice 
when the main constraint to improved nutrition is implementation, rather than the 
policy environment, which is often the case. In such contexts, an operational level 
incentive instrument may be warranted, rather than a policy reform measure.
• Requires that malnutrition be recognised as a national priority. In order for a govern-
ment to decide to include nutrition in a DPF, the country’s malnutrition challenge and 
its economic implications will need to be understood by policy-makers (particularly in 
the central ministries such as finance and planning), which is often not the case.
• Does not address socio-cultural or behavioral challenges. In many countries, the 
core challenge to improving nutritional status may be socio-cultural or behavioral 
at the household or community level. A DPF alone would not be suitable instrument 
to address these constraints.
• Reforms may be reversed. Changes in the government or policymakers may result 
in the reversal of reforms if it was merely a high-level decision. The DPF must be 
designed carefully to ensure that the disbursement triggers fully institutionalize the 
reform and render a reversal difficult. Monitoring the trigger actions closely is an 
essential prerequisite for success.
• No guarantee of increased allocations to nutrition. There is no guarantee that IDA 
funds will be spent on nutrition services or programs since the World Bank does not 
track its funds separately under a DPF. The funds are comingled in the government 
budget. Therefore, unless the policy reform pertains directly to providing more nu-
trition resources, the DPF alone may not achieve an increased allocation.
Examples of Country Experience
India, Mozambique, Palestine, Peru
PERU P116264 
RESULTS & ACCOUNTABILITY (REACT) PROGRAMMATIC DPL 
Project development objective (PDO). 
Nutrition-specific objectives are to (i) 
increase demand for nutrition services 
by strengthening the operational 
effectiveness of the Juntos Conditional 
Cash Transfer (CCT) program; and (ii) 
improve coverage and quality of the 
supply of basic preventive health and 
nutrition services in the communities 
covered under the Articulated Nutritional 
Program (PAN), including Juntos.
Results of interest  REACT DPL series 
supports policies that are expected 
to lead to (i) improved parental 
understanding of expected outcomes 
in education, health, and nutrition; (ii) 
improved outcomes in second grade 
literacy, especially in rural schools; 
(iii) reduced maternal and neonatal 
mortality; and (iv) better nutrition 
outcomes. The government set a 
target of reducing undernutrition 
by 5 percent in five years.
Indicators  As a DPL, this operation does 
not have “indicators” in the conventional 
sense of the term. However, it included 
the following “prior actions” specific 
to nutrition: MINSA has changed SIS 
norms to include the CRED (child 
growth and development) protocol; 
Goals for CRED production are agreed 
between the health sector and the 
PBB system for each health executing 
unit; Ministry of Finance increased the 
2010 budget for CRED by 330 percent, 
compared to the 2009 budget, and 
allocated the additional funds to regions 
with a low level of CRED spending 
relative to their malnutrition levels.
Operational modality  Activities to 
support both objectives include a 
strong emphasis on promoting good 
governance to monitor the impact of the 
government programs such as Juntos. A 
manual and supporting communication 
materials were developed for Community 
Nutrition Promoters, and the expected 
height gain in the first two years of 
life was popularized. The operation is 
adapted to respond to the country’s 
results-based financing strategy and 
provides direct support to PAN. 
Evaluation: After 10 years, the results 
are remarkable—stunting decreased 
from 28 percent to 14 percent.  
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•  Program for Results (PforR) and Investment Project Financing  
with Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs)
 Definition
• PforR is a relatively new lending instrument which links IDA / IBRD development 
financing to results and moves from the “project approach” towards a “program ap-
proach”, whereby the World Bank is financing a “slice” of a government program. 
Prior to the PforR, to financially incentivise certain results, teams used Disburse-
ment Linked Indicators (DLIs) within Investment Lending—currently called In-
vestment Project Financing (IPF). Although many operations still use DLIs under 
IPFs, as a proxy for PforR, both instruments essentially adopt the same incentivising 
principle that seeks to finance outputs rather than inputs. Therefore, we treat PforR 
and DLI operations together.
• Under PforR and DLI, disbursements from the World Bank to the country are based 
on achieving predetermined targets or results, rather than inputs purchased. Results 
could be outputs or outcomes, but are usually defined in terms of outputs—some-
times called intermediate outcomes. In practice, many DLI operations use process 
milestones as “results” or “proxy results.”
• The World Bank does not prescribe the activities and expenditures for a PforR or 
DLI operation. The funds go to the treasury and may finance a specific program, 
e.g., the budget of the Ministry of Health or the HIV/AIDS or the maternal and child 
(MCH) programs. As long as the results are achieved, the money can be spent on 
anything within the program. In the case of an IPF with DLIs, disbursements are 
made against a list of pre-agreed “eligible expenditures.” 
• Disbursements are based on achieving specific targets which are usually confirmed 
through independent verification. Within that framework, some prorate the dis-
bursement proportionately to how much of the target is met, while others disburse 
on an all-or-none basis, i.e., partial achievement or underachievement of targets 
merits zero disbursement. A delayed achievement of targets can result in delayed 
disbursement or disqualification of the amount linked to the delayed result. 
• PforR and DLI operations differ from DPF in that disbursements are results-based, 
rather than policy action based. They move the incentives beyond policy actions to 
program results.
• Although PforR and DLI operations tend to incentivize the national level, they can 
also be used directly at the sub-national level, e.g., in a province / state in a large 
country, or to incentivize national to sub-national transfers in a manner similar to 
performance-based budgeting. 
Potential Strengths
• May lead to greater ownership and sustainability. PforR / DLI operations entail 
no micromanagement by the World Bank, like the DPF. In the case of the PforR, the 
country’s own systems are used. Therefore, the results are likely to be more systemic 
and sustainable.
• Provides flexibility in implementation. PforR / DLI operations place less focus on 
inputs and process. Although some level of attention is necessary at these stages 
of the development cycle to understand any problems in case the results are not 
achieved. This approach empowers managers, and provides flexibility on ways to 
achieve the results. Nutrition programs could particularly benefit from such delega-
tion of authority, since they often require innovation at the grassroots level.
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• Enhances accountability for achieving results. With the strong focus on results, the 
responsibility for achieving them is placed squarely on the government. If results 
are not achieved, the government does not receive the funds. If results are delayed, 
disbursements are also delayed or cancelled. The PforR / DLI instrument directly in-
centivises performance and enhances accountability by shifting the focus from proj-
ect administration processes (e.g., volume of procurement transactions) to results. 
• Can increase the visibility of nutrition programs. The focus on results (and on the 
resources that get released when the results are achieved) can provide additional 
visibility to nutrition within the wide range of priorities faced by governments in 
program implementation. 
• Can incentivise healthy competition. It is possible to design these operations to 
introduce competition between sub-units of government (e.g. provinces, states or 
districts) on the timing for the achievement of results, such that the first few sub-
units to achieve a particular result would get an additional financial incentive. 
• Greater likelihood of achieving results. If the operation is well designed, i.e., appro-
priate indicators with realistic targets are selected, a clear verification protocol is 
agreed upon, and the necessary monitoring systems are established, the likelihood 
of successfully achieving the agreed upon results is high.
Potential Challenges
• Capacity of the government to deliver. As the World Bank focuses more on out-
puts and outcomes and leaves it largely to the government to reach the results using 
its own processes and inputs, PforR / DLI operations adopt a hands-off approach, 
which assumes robust governance systems and the government’s capacity to plan 
and implement its programs to achieve the agreed results. These assumptions may 
not always hold true, especially for ministries responsible for nutrition which are 
often weaker. It is sometimes necessary to design “hybrid” operations in which the 
focus is mainly on incentivising results but which also contain a more traditional 
input-driven form of technical assistance to enhance capacity to deliver. 
• Reluctance by governments to accept the risk of non-performance.  Governments 
often may be reluctant to accept the risk of incurring expenditures without guaran-
teed financing. Often their systems are not very flexible to manage that risk. Even 
though the first year’s disbursement are made as an advance, the subsequent year’s 
financing depends on concrete targets being met, which means that there is a real 
risk of funds not flowing. In nutrition programs involving regular service delivery 
or cash distribution, such stoppage of fund-flow could be seriously detrimental to 
the population.
• Complex operations. PforR/DLI instrument may not be suited for very complex op-
erations with too many monitored results. The more indicators, the less their mon-
etary value since the total envelope is fixed and numerous indicators would be more 
difficult to monitor. 
• Selecting the right indicators. Certain service-oriented indicators are easier to 
measure, report, and pay against, e.g., vitamin A supplementation, and growth mon-
itoring. Certain others, especially community level indicators, like exclusive breast-
feeding are difficult to measure, forcing us to settle for knowledge indicators rather 
than actual behaviors. More creativity is needed.  
• Limiting the number of indicators. Typically, health and nutrition operations have 
numerous results of interest. To make the operation manageable, the list of indi-
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cators must be kept short, usually less than 10. Some indicators of interest must be 
omitted from being linked to financing, which is feasible if a robust set of tracer indi-
cators is sufficient for the absence of others. The omitted indicators can be included 
in the results framework and monitored without being linked to disbursement. This 
positioning, however, would affect the level of priority of those indicators.
• Results must be achieved in a short timeframe. The PforR / DLI approach cannot di-
rectly incentivise results that take longer than a year to manifest, e.g., behavior change 
or nutritional status improvements, because disbursements cannot wait for those re-
sults to be demonstrated. Therefore, establishing measurable intermediate results is 
critical and could serve as a good proxy for the ultimate outcome of interest. This 
challenge can be mitigated by “breaking down” results with longer gestation periods 
into specific intermediate results which can each be incentivised.
• Potential to miss some important results. Due to the necessary selectivity of indicators 
linked to financing, other important results could be neglected. This risk is particularly 
challenging for a complex area like nutrition, with a wide spectrum of results of interest.
Examples of Country Experience 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India (national nutrition project as well as projects in the states 
of Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh), Indonesia, Laos, Morocco, Myanmar, 
Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Tanzania
Project development objective (PDO)  
To (i) strengthen the Integrated Child 
Development Services (ICDS) policy 
framework, systems and capacities, 
and facilitate community engagement, 
to ensure greater focus on children 
under three years of age; and (ii) 
strengthen convergent actions for 
improved nutrition outcomes.    
Results of interest  Improved sys-
tems in terms of planning, record-
ing, reporting and monitoring of 
information, improved delivery of 
services, capacity-building of the 
frontline workers to improve mater-
nal, infant, and young child feeding 
behaviors among pregnant and 
lactating women and their children.
Indicators  PDO indicators include: An-
ganwadi Centers (AWCs) implementing 
the inter-personal communication (IPC) 
activities focused on infant and young 
child feeding (IYCF) practices; and proj-
ect states in which pilots of “convergent 
nutrition action” have been implement-
ed and evaluated in at least one dis-
trict. Thirteen DLI milestones were set; 
all of them are system improvement 
indicators, e.g., real-time ICT-based 
M&E system with standardized oper-
ating procedures and specifications 
for hardware; people trained in the 
system or on specific nutrition mod-
ules, outreach and community-based 
processes such as monthly events held. 
Service delivery outputs are monitored 
as non-DLI, e.g., pregnant and lactat-
ing women, children (with proportion 
of female children amongst these), 
and adolescents who have benefit-
ted from the services. No behavioral 
outcomes are being measured.  
Operational modality  Of the 13 DLI, 
six are under the responsibility of the 
central government and seven are at 
the state level. The center has $7 mil-
lion for its six DLIs. Additional incentive: 
Flexifund / Challenge Fund ($5 million) 
for the first three states that meet 
each of the DLIs. The seven that belong 
at the state level, $25,000 per DLI, 
could be used for CCT or PBF or such 
approaches. The first three states to 
achieve each DLI get an additional in-
centive amount. Under the restructured 
design, interventions are focused on 
behavior change for nutrition primarily 
by building worker capacities to counsel 
for behavior change, through better 
outreach, and to focus on children 0–3 
years of age, e.g., improved breastfeed-
ing / complementary feeding practices. 
Innovations include the introduction 
of a mobile app that allows Anganwa-
di workers to enter data, generates 
due lists, helps daily work-planning, 
sends SMS alerts, promotes better 
growth-monitoring, generates the 
growth chart, and has BCC videos.   
INDIA P121731 
ICDS SYSTEM STRENGTHENING NUTRITION IMPROVEMENT PROJECT (ISSNIP)
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• Performance Based Budgeting (PBB) 
Definition 
• PBB is a mechanism by which a higher level of government allocates resources to a 
lower level of government, based on the latter’s performance measured by agreed in-
dicators and targets. For example, the Ministry of Finance might allocate the budget 
for the Ministry of Health based on the past year’s performance. Or in a federal sys-
tem, the central government might allocate the state, provincial or district budgets 
on the basis of past performance. PBB usually involves a MOU or similar arrange-
ment between the financing entity and implementing entity.  
• PBB is not the usual way of budgeting in most developing countries. Budgets are gen-
erally developed using historical data of allocations and expenditures and based on 
inputs rather than outputs. A reformist and forward looking government and leader-
ship is critical for PBB to work.
Potential Strengths 
• Budgets reflect priorities and reforms. If nutrition results are included in the perfor-
mance measures that influence the budgetary allocation, sub-national priorities are 
likely to move in a direction favorable to nutrition programs. 
• Closer to service delivery and the needs of people. PBB moves the incentives and 
risks to the sub-national levels, which are closer to the action. PBB empowers sub-na-
tional level managers and provides flexibility on ways to achieve the results. This 
devolved accountability and the related flexibility is important for nutrition given 
that the approaches may vary based on the specific determinants and the socio-eco-
nomic composition of the populations. 
• Enhances accountability. PBB is likely to be attractive to the ministries of finance 
(MOFs) because an enhanced level of accountability exists prior to budgetary allo-
cation. PBB allows the MOF the flexibility to allocate resources to the ministries and 
departments that have demonstrated a record of producing better results. This may 
be particularly useful for nutrition programs, some of which have a legacy of poor 
performance, which has discouraged central ministries from further allocations. 
• Can incentivise healthy competition. It is possible to design these operations to intro-
duce competition between sub-units of government, e.g., provinces, states or districts.
• Alignment with the policy framework. PBB is suitable for achieving program re-
sults when the national policy environment is already conducive to program im-
plementation at sub-national levels, and robust monitoring systems are available, 
along with the necessary information base. PBB can be used to incentivize shifts in 
delivery that are introduced in recent policy reforms.
• Confirms and enhances commitment to nutrition. Including nutrition results un-
der PBB requires and indicates that the MOF and the MOH—and other implement-
ing line ministries—have a higher level of commitment to nutrition results.
• May increase financial allocations to nutrition. Nutrition could benefit from PBB 
because often, a constraint is the insufficient resource allocation—a problem at the 
operational level rather than the policy level.
Potential Challenges 
• Requires a change in mindset and strong leadership. PBB entails an entirely new 
way of planning, budgeting, and financial management, as most governments use 
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historical budgeting. Even though PBB has strong potential, it may be difficult to im-
plement in some contexts since it involves a fundamental change in mindset and the 
way of doing business.
• Requires strong capacity for implementation. Implementation is not guaranteed 
and it may not affect behaviors at the service delivery or household levels, which are 
critical to nutrition results. On the other hand, if the incentive is sufficiently strong 
and there is sufficient autonomy, the receiving entities may be able to organize 
themselves to deliver, or a complementary technical assistance component could 
be designed into the World Bank operation to address specific implementation 
weaknesses. 
• Requires devolution of authority. PBB requires a strong degree of authority to be 
devolved to the operational levels and the necessary capacity to be built, without 
which the incentives won’t be empowering. PBB may not be suitable in countries 
where sub-national capacities or governance systems are weak or in which the nec-
essary autonomy for delivery is not provided.
• PBB could increase inequities since it rewards better performers. Where sub-nation-
al capacities vary across states or districts, PBB could benefit the already better re-
sourced states and districts, which may be the better performers. This could result in 
denying the low-performers the very resources that they need to build their capacities 
to perform better, thus perpetuating a vicious cycle of low resources • low capacity • 
low performance • further low resources. This scenario needs to be avoided by allo-
cating a minimum level of resources based on need and by adding a bonus allocation 
for performance, rather than making the whole budget dependent on performance. 
Often the lowest performing provinces or districts are also where the highest propor-
tions of malnourished people live. Another way to avoid this scenario is to allocate re-
sources based on the rate of change, i.e., whereby sub-national units with the greatest 
improvements from the baseline would receive the largest allocations. 
• Risk of focusing on only a subset of results of interest. PBB could skew program at-
tention to selected results at the expense of other important ones, which is the case 
of PforR or any other incentivized financing system. This is a particular challenge 
for nutrition, which has a complex range of determinants requiring several results 
to be tracked. 
• A disconnect may exists between budget and execution. If applied narrowly, this 
instrument’s potential benefits could be limited to priority setting, since it may only 
impact the budget and not necessarily the execution. However, approaches could be 
designed that not only focus on allocations but also on execution of budgets. 
Examples of Country Experience
Argentina, Peru
 Health Facility Level
• Performance Based Financing (PBF) 
Definition 
• While results-based financing (RBF) is used as a broad term encompassing several 
different types of incentivising results, performance based financing (PBF) usually 
refers to an approach that specifically pays financial incentives to the individual or 
institutional service providers. The payments are based on the quantity and quality 
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of outputs delivered. The terms such as “fee for service” or “pay-for-performance” 
are sometimes used to describe this instrument.
• The additional funds from PBF can be used to improve the facility or services, and / 
or to pay “bonuses” to the personnel. How these funds are distributed at the health fa-
cility level and what proportion could be paid as bonuses or salary supplements varies 
widely. In some countries, these decisions are left to the health facility level managers. 
Whereas in other countries, strict guidelines are sent from the central level.
• PBF works best when the unit being contracted (e.g., the health facility) has a high 
degree of autonomy as to how it delivers services. In most countries, however, this 
autonomy is circumscribed by some rules such as public service rules on hiring and 
firing of staff.
• PBF involves a separation of functions between the regulator, purchaser, and service 
provider. It involves contracting an external agency which is responsible for the verifi-
cation and payment of services. A specific package of services is defined and rates are 
applied for each service. Both public and private health facilities can be contracted for 
service delivery, depending on the regulatory framework in the country and the avail-
ability of these providers. Specific catchment areas are defined for each service provider.
• Prior to payment, the quantity of services is verified, usually through the internal 
inspection service of the Ministry of Health. On a less frequent basis (e.g., quarterly) 
community-based organisations undertake counter-verification of the results. This 
counter-verification serves as a “check and balance” against collusion between ser-
vice providers and the inspection services. 
• While PBF has been applied mainly at the health facility level to date, the basic te-
nets of the approach are being increasingly applied at the community level as well as 
at all levels within a health system. The latter enables an alignment of incentives to 
improve service delivery. For example, World Bank projects that use a PBF approach 
in health are increasingly establishing performance contracts not only at the health 
facility level, but also at the other administrative levels of the system (e.g., district, 
provincial) all the way to the regulator at the national level. 
• Some PBF approaches also provide a higher payment to a health facility for having 
reached pre-identified members of the community (through community-based tar-
geting) with free services. These could be the poorest members of the community or 
people with special needs, such as people living with disabilities.  It is likely that this 
targeting is reaching households with a higher likelihood of malnutrition.  
• Increasingly, a quality checklist (some have approximately 200 indicators) is being 
used to assess the quality of services provided, and adjustments in payments (either 
negative or positive incentives) are applied based on the quality checklist score.  
Potential Strengths 
• Closer to the beneficiary. PBF moves the program resources, incentives, account-
ability, and risks mainly to the health facility level, thus making it more likely to suc-
ceed—if the binding constraints are at that level. In addition, in countries where elite 
capture is a challenge, PBF helps circumvent elite capture at the central level because 
the bulk of the financial resources are directed to frontline health facilities through 
payments directly to their bank accounts.
• Greater social accountability. The counter-verification carried out by community 
organizations is a practical way to empower communities to have oversight over 
service delivery. When nutrition is part of the services being counter-verified, this 
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enables communities to improve their understanding and sense of ownership of 
their malnutrition challenge.
• Increased transparency. The management information system for PBF (web portal) 
makes data available publicly about the performance of the health system. This could 
be a valuable source of “real-time” information on some aspects of nutrition services, 
which can be used to review health facility performance more regularly. Data on nu-
trition interventions in most countries is not collected often enough to provide regu-
lar monitoring and accountability.
• Potential to increase the focus on nutrition. By adding specific nutrition services 
to a PBF program, it is possible to enhance the focus and attention to those services, 
which could otherwise be neglected and subsumed under a broader package of ma-
ternal and child health services.
• Increased monitoring and feedback. While the verification of quality and quantity is 
primarily set up to confirm payments, the process also enables service providers to 
get regular feedback and to learn from their mistakes. This could be a useful means 
to increase capacity of service providers to deliver nutrition interventions, compen-
sating somewhat for the often low level of nutrition training which the personnel of 
health facilities receive.
• Sharper focus on the highest priority services. The PBF package of services is a sub-
set of the range of services offered by a facility. The services are chosen on the basis 
of their ability to address the highest burden of disease in the country.  The sharper 
focus on the delivery of these interventions should increase the impact on the highest 
priority public health concerns.
• Greater focus on quality. PBF may improve the impact of some of the key nutri-
tion-specific interventions that could have a significant impact, if they are delivered 
with high quality. For example, growth monitoring and promotion (GMP) has had 
limited impact to date because the focus tends to be on weighing children and the 
quality of the accompanying counseling when a child’s growth is faltering is weak. 
Through the quality checklist, PBF may be able to correct this.
• Tends to improve access to services. An important aspect of PBF is the initial busi-
ness planning that takes place with health facilities to enable them to restructure 
their work so as to maximize their efficiency in service delivery. This can lead to a re-
duction in fees, which in turn increases demand and often not only increases access 
but also improves overall revenue for the health facility.
• May lead to efficiencies in the supply chain. Increasingly, PBF is used to improve the 
alignment of the functioning of the pharmaceutical supply chain with the needs of 
the service providers and clients. These efficiencies would be of benefit to nutrition 
services (independent of whether the service is one of those purchased through PBF 
or not) because breaks in the supply chain are often a major barrier for the delivery of 
nutrition programs. For this benefit to accrue to nutrition, all essential nutrition sup-
plies must be included in the list that is assessed as part of the PBF quality checklist 
for the pharmaceutical system. 
• Encourages greater autonomy. PBF is expected to empower local level managers 
and provide flexibility in ways to achieve the results. The effectiveness of PBF de-
pends largely on autonomy being genuinely granted to health facility level manag-
ers. This autonomy is important for nutrition because different approaches may be 
needed to deliver effective services (especially those which require behavior change) 
depending on the socio-cultural composition of the community.
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• May encourage benchmarking and learning. PBF could instill an environment of 
healthy competition among health facilities, especially if financial incentives are 
complemented by non-financial ones. Increasingly, PBF programs are developing 
web portals that contain performance information about each participating unit. In 
addition to increasing transparency, the data enables positive deviance analysis and 
opportunities to learn from the better performers.  Positive deviance is an approach 
that has worked well for nutrition, but mainly at a relatively limited scale so far. PBF 
data systems may enable a scaling up. 
Potential Challenges
• Focus primarily on the supply of services. While PBF could contribute significantly 
to increasing the quality and quantity of some of the nutrition-specific interventions, 
it is insufficient by itself to address malnutrition. So far, PBF’s main limitation for nu-
trition is that it primarily incentivizes service delivery, i.e., the supply side. Nutrition 
interventions also require strong action on the demand side—at the household and 
community levels.
• Possible resistance. PBF entails a new way of compensating providers and could face 
resistance from staff and bureaucratic hurdles. For example, current rules may not 
allow for payment of bonuses to health care providers. In most settings this chal-
lenge has proven to be manageable, but has required important investments in time 
upfront to explain the benefits of the new approach.
• Potential cost increase. PBF would increase the cost of service provision, since the 
performance pay is in addition to existing compensation and there are additional 
costs related to verification, etc. Generally such additional costs to the system are 
not significant and are considered well worth the results of improved quantity and 
quality of services. Nonetheless, these additional costs need to be assessed against 
the fiscal space for health and the overall cost-effectiveness of the interventions. In 
the case of some preventive nutrition services (and some curative services), which 
concern a large number of individuals in the catchment area (as opposed to disease 
curative services where only the sick come to facilities), the large numbers can result 
in cost escalations, which has been why some nutrition services have not been in-
cluded in the PBF package in the past. This challenge may require further targeting 
of nutrition services.  
• Balancing nutrition with other interventions in the package of services. Only a lim-
ited number of services can be included in a PBF system, which poses a challenge 
as to how many and which nutrition indicators to include. Until recently, the PBF 
package that was most often used had focused on two nutrition services: a growth 
monitoring session (without necessarily focusing on the availability or quality of ac-
companying counseling) and treatment of severe acute malnutrition. Given the poor 
performance of growth monitoring globally and the small proportion of children that 
suffer from severe acute malnutrition (SAM) (compared to stunting), these two ser-
vices are likely to have only limited direct impact on stunting. However, other basic 
health services such as antenatal care, treatment of malaria, treatment of diarrhea 
and child immunization, all of which are typically included in a standard PBF pack-
age, will have an indirect positive impact on nutrition.  
• Verification of certain nutrition services is difficult. One of the strengths of PBF is 
the system of checks and balances through verification and counter-verification. Be-
cause some of the nutrition services relate to behavior change (e.g., exclusive breast-
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feeding, complementary feeding, compliance with a regime of iron supplements), 
which are difficult to verify, these high-impact services have tended to be excluded 
from the PBF package. However, some of the newer World Bank operations are test-
ing the limits of the verification challenge. The positive aspect of community count-
er-verification of some of these services is that it could generate local involvement 
and the potential to change community norms related to certain behaviors.
• Capacity to deliver nutrition services. The PBF approach provides health facilities a 
high degree of autonomy to organize themselves to deliver the services which are in-
centivized. Most of these services are at the core of medical training, whereas nutri-
tion often occupies a very limited space in the medical syllabus. It may be necessary 
initially to offer service providers technical assistance to ensure they have sufficient 
capacity to deliver nutrition services. 
• Potential bias against services that are not incentivized. As in any instrument in-
centivizing specific services, other (non-incentivized) services may be neglected. As 
noted earlier, this may pose a problem for nutrition because the services that need to 
be delivered likely exceed the capacity for a PBF to absorb.   
• Ensuring equitable distribution of the incentive. To avoid conflict among staff, often 
the additional funds are just equally shared rather than based on individual perfor-
mance, even though the whole health facility receives the additional funds based on 
performance. It is much more difficult to institute performance-based rewards at the in-
dividual provider level without large-scale reform of the human resource (HR) systems.
• Workload of community health workers. Some programs are exploring using PBF 
to incentivize community outreach through community health workers. While this 
approach holds promise for nutrition, the community health workers’ range of du-
ties and work volume needs to be consider to assess the feasibility of assigning them 
more tasks.
CAMEROON P104525 
HEALTH SECTOR SUPPORT INVESTMENT PROJECT
Project development objective (PDO)  
To increase utilization and improve 
the quality of health services with a 
particular focus on child and maternal 
health and communicable diseases. 
 
Results of interest  Health (improved 
utilization and quality of health ser-
vices), with maternal and under-five 
nutrition results added subsequently. 
Indicators  The original PDO indicators 
were (i) children immunized for DPT3 
(< 12 months); (ii) births attended by 
skilled professional; (iii) children under 
five sleeping under insecticide treated 
bednets the night before the survey; (iv) 
tuberculosis treatment success rate 
(percentage of those who are smear 
positive who are successfully treated); 
and (v) patients reporting satisfaction 
with health services. The following nu-
trition-specific indicators were included: 
under-five children with severe acute 
malnutrition (SAM) and moderate acute 
malnutrition (MAM) treated respec-
tively at the hospital and the primary 
health center (PHC) level; referrals and 
counter-referral for nutrition (teased 
out from the total list of referrals). At 
the community level: patients of SAM 
and MAM referred by the community 
health workers (CHW) to the facility 
(and confirmed); household visits by a 
team (CHW + facility staff) according 
to protocol. At the hospital level, the 
number of inpatient days for SAM.
Operational modality  Improving district 
level health services through PBF at the 
primary health center and hospital level. 
Also extended PBF to the community 
level. Approved in 2009, the operation 
took two years to get off the ground in 
earnest. Between 2011 and 2014, pilots 
were tested and in 2014, additional 
financing enabled nationwide scale up. 
Nutrition indicators were added to the 
existing PBF program in one region. The 
operation is now financing the nutri-
tion outputs throughout the country, 
although the problem primarily affects 
the north and the east. UNICEF pays 
for the nutrition results for one region 
and IDA finances for the other regions. 
Evaluation showed  The provision of 
services increased, but it is too ear-
ly to evaluate nutrition outcomes. 
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Examples of Country Experience 
Armenia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Gambia, Ghana, Haiti, Kenya, Lao Peoples 
Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Zimba-
bwe, Zambia  
• Performance Based Contracting (PBC) 
Definition 
• PBC takes place when service delivery is contracted out (or contracted in) often us-
ing non-state actors, e.g., international or national nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) or community-based organizations or for-profit private sector providers, and 
the contracts are performance-based. 
• The contracts focus on the outputs, quality, or outcomes that tie at least a portion of 
the contractor’s payment, contract extensions, or contract renewals to achieving spe-
cific, measureable performance standards. Although any contract would be expected 
to have a performance clause—and could be terminated in the case of non-perfor-
mance—PBC links payment to performance more explicitly and based on specific 
services and outputs to be delivered. 
• A standard package of health services is defined in the contract, which could include 
nutrition services. Performance is usually assessed (and payment made) based on 
delivery of the full agreed package, as opposed to PBF where payments are tied to 
individual services. The verification is at a more macro level than PBF, such as inde-
pendent coverage surveys.
• PBC is usually focused mainly on health facility based services, although it typically 
also includes community activities (e.g., screening for severe acute malnutrition) to 
create demand for facility-based services. 
Potential Strengths
• Competitive selection. Contracted entities have to compete to be selected, and again to 
have their contracts renewed at regular intervals. This competition brings to the fore 
available capacity, which the government may not have been able to tap into previously.
• Alignment. Often the selected entities were already delivering similar services in the 
area (perhaps at a smaller scale) but with relative autonomy from government and with 
direct financing from donors. PBC can serve to align the work of these entities with 
government priorities. 
• More rigorous than traditional contracts. By linking payment to the quantity and qual-
ity of services delivered, as per agreed checklists, PBC is a better remedy for non-per-
formance than traditional contracts, which usually have only a blunt remedy: the early 
termination of the contract. 
• Rapid increase in provision of services. Particularly in fragile settings where health 
service delivery is compromised and services reduced, PBC usually translates into a 
rapid increase in the availability of services.
• Flexibility in service delivery. Because the contracted NGOs use their own manage-
ment policies and procedures, they have more flexibility than a government entity to 
organize themselves for the particular challenges of service delivery, including hiring 
and firing staff according to needs and offering salaries aligned with market rates to 
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attract qualified staff. This flexibility is potentially a significant advantage to deliver 
nutrition services because these often need to be adapted to the local context.
• Multisectoral convergence for results. Because PBC can be geographically based (i.e., 
a given geographical area is assigned to a particular contracted entity) and the enti-
ty is more flexible than traditional government ministries, the approach can facilitate 
multisectoral convergence to achieve certain results. This multisectoral convergence 
is particularly important for nutrition and has been a challenge when working through 
traditional ministries.
• Local acceptability. In areas of conflict, if the selection of the contracted entities places 
a strong emphasis on proof of having worked effectively in the particular context, it is 
likely that the entity will be better accepted by the local communities, as well as the 
parties in conflict. Often, an NGO with a long history of operating successfully in an 
area is selected and brings to the contract not only its technical and managerial capaci-
ty but also its positioning and knowledge of the local political economy.
• Prioritization of services. PBC involves defining a package of services (sometimes in 
tiers, such as a “basic package” an “enhanced package,” etc.), which is to be delivered 
under the contract. The process of defining the package (and adjusting it as needed) 
provides an opportunity to ensure that the health services offered are aligned with the 
burden of disease in the targeted area and with the latest evidence of what works to 
address that burden.  
Potential Challenges 
• Government capacity to enforce contracts. The PBC requires significant capacity 
for contract monitoring and enforcement, which can be lacking in some ministries 
of health. Technical assistance on contract management may be required as part of a 
World Bank operation using PBC.
• Availability of providers. In some settings where PBC has been used (e.g., fragile 
environments), a limited number of national organizations exist with the capacity 
to deliver good quality health services. The competitive selection process needs to 
include international entities, but also ensure that their knowledge and capacity to 
operate in the local environment is a key part of the selection process.
• Challenging to terminate contracts. Termination could be difficult to enforce be-
cause the government will need to find an alternative to continue service delivery 
and PBC can adjust for under-performance or higher performance. Termination re-
quires unequivocal information. 
• Perceptions of government about beneficiary expectations. In some settings, the 
government is uncomfortable not being seen by the population as the direct deliverer 
of services. It may be possible to alleviate this apprehension with an effective com-
munication strategy explaining to the public the role of government is to regulate and 
purchase services.
• Prioritizing nutrition. In some settings, nutrition was not well defined in the pack-
age of services and was limited to a few interventions. For example, because some 
NGOs’ recent experience in implementing humanitarian assistance projects focused 
on the treatment of severe acute malnutrition, there can be a tendency to assume that 
this nutrition intervention is sufficient. It may be necessary to review the package 
to define a clear set of nutrition interventions along with indicators to track in the 
information system to determine performance.
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• Timing of measurement. In some cases, measurement of PBC performance has been 
done less frequently (i.e., every six or twelve months) than in PBF. Because the avail-
ability of data drives the performance reviews, the less frequent reviews results into 
slower corrections of bad performance and potentially weaker accountability.  
• Cost of measurement. The surveys required to track performance, while useful be-
yond managing PBC contracts, can be costly. These surveys need to include a range 
of nutrition indicators and be well integrated into an overall national health manage-
ment information system and nutrition surveillance system.  
Examples of Country Experience 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Pakistan, South Sudan    
 Community Level
•  Performance Based Community Contracts (PBCC) / Community PBF
Definition 
• More recently, in combination with Community Driven Development (CDD) plat-
forms—or sometimes riding on other community mobilization efforts—some coun-
tries have started using performance based community contracts (PBCC) to incentiv-
ize nutrition results. That is a type of PBF at the community level.
• Performance based contracts are signed with community groups and payments are 
made on the basis of results achieved.
AFGHANISTAN P112445 / P129663 
TWO BACK-TO-BACK OPERATIONS INCORPORATED PBC AND PBF
The project development objective 
(PDO) was to contribute to improv-
ing the health and nutritional status 
of the people of Afghanistan, with a 
greater focus on women and children 
and undeserved areas of the country.
 
Results of interest  Improved service de-
livery coverage, including quality of care. 
Nutrition was part of the maternal and 
child health package. Health workers 
sent a report to the Ministry of Health, 
through NGOs, claiming payment for 
the delivery of health services. The 
request is now electronically submitted.  
P129663—SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT FOR HEALTH ACTION IN TRANSITION (SEHAT)  P112446—STRENGTHENING  
HEALTH ACTIVITIES FOR THE RURAL 
POOR (SHARP)  Included contract-
ing of NGOs with some performance 
based incentives complemented by 
PBF at the health facility level.
The PDO is to expand the scope, qual-
ity, and coverage of health services 
provided to the population, particularly 
for the poor, in the project areas, and 
to enhance the stewardship functions 
of the Ministry of Public Health. 
Indicators  Almost the same indica-
tors are used for PBC and RBF, mainly 
for maternal and child health, such as 
skilled birth attendance and immuni-
zation coverage. But specific nutrition 
indicators have also been included, e.g., 
pregnant and lactating women receiving 
a package of infant and young child nu-
trition services; and under-five children 
with severe acute malnutrition who are 
receiving the requisite treatment. There 
is also one indicator on quality of care.  
Operational modality and the incen-
tives remain the same as in SHARP 
but performance payments are also 
made at the NGO level. Thus perfor-
mance bonuses are paid not only to the 
individual providers but also to the NGOs 
(20 percent based on performance). The 
implementation of NGO contracting is 
through performance based partnership 
agreements. Significantly, in addition to 
financing the service delivery contracts, 
the operation has considerable amounts 
of resources allocated to capacity build-
ing and system strengthening at the 
central and provincial levels.
Evaluation  Afghanistan has possibly 
the largest PBC operation in health / 
nutrition. Evaluation shows that cover-
age of health services has improved, and 
child / infant mortality has decreased. 
Maternal mortality has also decreased 
significantly.
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• As for PPF, the results are verified before the payment is made and the results can 
include both quantitative and qualitative dimensions.
• Community-PBF can be either stand-alone or linked to operations that also establish 
performance contracts at other levels, e.g., facility, sub-national, and national. 
• Unlike CDD, where the starting point is the community-expressed needs, with PBCC 
/ community-based PBF, the starting point is a specific development objective (e.g., 
reducing child stunting). Intermediate results are selected based on a clear theory 
of change. 
Potential Strengths 
• Collective action. Community-based projects can facilitate collective action that 
would enable the removal of community-wide barriers that are creating nutrition 
problems. Some of these barriers can be social (e.g., social norms related to the role 
of men in caring for young children and / or about open defecation) or physical (e.g., 
building a bridge to ensure easier access to a health facility, or removing conditions 
that enable mosquitos to breed and transmit malaria). Nutrition programs have had 
success in using positive deviance (e.g., identifying which households have less mal-
nutrition in a community and pinpointing which factors have led to that result) to 
identify priority key community barriers to better nutrition. 
• Multisectoral convergence. Community-based projects, if well designed, can en-
courage communities to seek services from various ministries and enable the conver-
gence to take place. This is important for nutrition, which requires a mix of sectoral 
interventions. 
• Flexibility of design. The determinants of malnutrition and the socio-cultural barri-
ers to change will vary by community. Community approaches enable communities 
to adapt global knowledge to their particular situations. However, that adaptation 
may require some external facilitation, e.g., through coaches.
THE GAMBIA P143650 
MATERNAL AND CHILD NUTRITION AND HEALTH RESULTS PROJECT 
Project development objective (PDO). 
To increase the utilization of community 
nutrition and primary maternal and 
child health services in selected regions 
in the country. The results of interest 
include both improved nutrition and 
health among women and children. 
Results of interest  Improved knowl-
edge about exclusive breastfeeding, 
postnatal care, etc., some indicators 
on hygiene, e.g., cleaning up the village, 
etc., and sanitation, such as building of 
latrines, etc. Nutrition-specific results 
included: pregnant / lactating women, 
adolescent girls and / or under-five 
children reached by basic nutrition 
services; children between 6–59 months 
receiving vitamin A supplementation; 
pregnant women receiving iron and 
folic acid supplement; children under 
24 months benefiting from improved 
IYCF practices; and under-five children 
treated for moderate or severe acute 
malnutrition. Under the additional 
financing, the following nutrition-spe-
cific results were added: Baby-Friendly 
Community Initiative villages in the 
region; vulnerable households sup-
ported in gardening; and communities 
supported in establishing food banks.
Indicators  PDO-level indicators were 
children 0–6 months who are exclusively 
breastfed; deliveries attended by certi-
fied midwives in the preceding year; chil-
dren aged 6–59 months who received a 
dose of vitamin A within the past twelve 
months; women using modern methods 
of family planning in the preceding year. 
Under the additional financing, the fol-
lowing PDO-level indicator was added: 
children age 6–23 months consuming 
at least four out of six food groups.
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• Flexible definition of community. Communities can be defined geographically, but 
particularly in countries where social exclusion is a challenge, communities can or-
ganize themselves and carry out projects on the basis of characteristics such as eth-
nicity, social class, caste, etc. 
• Quality checklists. Quality checklists, which are generally associated with facili-
ty-level PBF, can also be used in PBCC or community-level PBF. The focus on quality, 
as seen earlier, is critical for the achievement of nutritional outcomes.
• Can promote utilization of services. Community-based contracts can be used to en-
gage community groups to promote the use of health and nutrition services and even 
do referrals. One such nutrition approach is community screening to identify severe 
acutely malnourished children, an approach which significantly increases the use 
of free nutrition rehabilitation sessions. Some nutrition services, e.g., treatment of 
diarrhea with zinc supplements and oral rehydration solution can be effectively de-
livered in the communities themselves, thus reducing the need to consult a facility 
and addressing the financial barriers that limit access for the poor. 
• Social accountability. Community involvement can create greater accountability at 
the local level, which can lead to a higher degree of transparency and consequently 
greater trust and program acceptance.
Potential Challenges 
• Communities do not always recognize nutrition as a problem. Malnutrition may not 
be seen as a priority problem by communities partly because other pressing needs 
compete for attention, and partly because of lack of awareness about the magnitude 
of the malnutrition problem within the community, its causation, and available solu-
tions. In communities where childhood undernutrition is widely prevalent, people 
may not recognize malnutrition as a critical problem since malnourished child are 
the norm. It may be beneficial to couple community-based PBF with awareness cre-
ation communications campaigns. 
• Challenge of verifying certain nutrition results. The nutrition results that require 
community mobilization often include behaviors that are difficult to verify, e.g., ex-
clusive breastfeeding or child complementary feeding behaviors. Because payments 
are linked to results, there is a risk that communities will learn to report the right re-
sults without the behaviors changing or changing behaviors but not to the extent re-
ported. This challenge is not insurmountable, but it will require creativity of design.
• Potential conflict of interest and capacity constraints for verification. Community 
groups can also play a role in supervision and monitoring the PBCC operation—a watch-
dog function. But this requires intensive technical assistance, facilitation or coaching.
• Role / presence of the state. Community-based RBF programs need to have an ef-
fective accompanying communications strategy to ensure that communities are 
aware when a program is part of a government strategy to enhance service deliv-
ery. Otherwise, some governments may resist using the approach and risk being 
perceived as having been replaced by community-based organizations “to do the 
government’s job.” 
• Capacity for nutrition. Even when community organizations and their members 
recognize nutrition as a priority, they do not always have the required knowledge to 
analyze the causes of malnutrition in their community or to select evidence-based 
interventions to reduce it. For example, communities sometimes decide to carry 
out growth monitoring, but this is insufficient to improve childhood malnutrition. 
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It must be complemented by appropriate nutrition counseling and / or supplemen-
tary feeding interventions demonstrated to caretakers, which is usually referred 
to as growth monitoring and promotion (GMP). This capacity challenge has been 
remedied in some World Bank operations by using tools (e.g., menus of options / 
decision trees) and coaches to facilitate community participation processes, specif-
ically on nutrition. 
• Need local institutional capacity. Though in principle, PBCC (PBF at the com-
munity level) could be used in the absence of a CDD operation, e.g., Cameroon, it 
is critically important to have some sort of community organization with which 
PBCC could operate. Often CDD operations provide the platform on which PBCC 
could be built, by establishing the requisite organizational framework through 
community mobilization efforts. In Djibouti, the existing CDD program provided 
a ready organizational platform. Without such preparatory efforts—either as part 
of CDD or not—or an existing community group such as women’s groups, a health 
promotion committee or a CBO, there would be no locus for PBCC.
• Communities are not always cohesive. Mobilizing communities could be a chal-
lenge, especially with governments that are reluctant to partner with NGOs and 
CBOs. Governments typically are not strong in community mobilization and need 
the help of NGOs or CBOs to accomplish it. Some geographic communities are not 
cohesive socially. In those cases, targeting by socially defined communities may be 
helpful or by introducing additional measures to improve social cohesion such as 
conflict prevention coaching in conflict-affected areas.
Examples of Country Experience 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, the Gambia, Ghana, India (state of Andhra Pradesh), 
Indonesia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Senegal, Nepal
•  Community Driven Development (CDD)
Definition 
• Community Driven Development (CDD) has been practiced for several decades, 
with a view to ensuring that development assistance is not just dictated from the 
top, but that the people’s voices are heard, and development efforts are responsive to 
their expressed needs. Through participatory rural appraisals and other such tech-
niques, CDD increases the involvement and participation of the beneficiaries in the 
planning, implementation, and oversight.
• Financing is provided to communities based on their own plans, addressing their 
own priorities and local approaches. The funds are spent on programs implement-
ed through community-based organizations with oversight by community leaders or 
committees.
• CDD requires strong community mobilization and capacity building, along with par-
ticipatory planning and implementation. Most governments require technical sup-
port, and the involvement of community-based organizations. 
Potential Strengths 
• Ownership and local relevance. Community interventions in CDD programs are 
more likely to be locally relevant, socially acceptable, and successful due to strong 
community involvement and consequently heightened empowerment compared to 
other development programs. These aspects of CDD approaches are valuable in nu-
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trition programs, which are highly dependent on behavior change to succeed, and 
those behaviors are anchored in local norms and traditions.
• Social accountability. Community involvement can create greater accountability at 
the local level, which can lead to a higher degree of transparency and consequently 
greater trust and program acceptance.
• Community contribution. Often communities provide a financial contribution as their 
“share” in the project. This helps build ownership and should enhance sustainability.
• Collective action. Community-based projects can facilitate collective action that 
would enable the removal of community-wide barriers that are creating nutrition 
problems. Some of these barriers can be social (e.g., social norms related to the role 
of men in caring for young children and / or about open defecation) or physical (e.g., 
building a bridge to ensure easier access to a health facility, removing conditions 
that enable mosquitos to breed and transmit malaria). Nutrition programs have had 
success in using positive deviance (e.g., identifying which households have less mal-
nutrition in a community and pinpointing which factors have led to that result) to 
identify priority key community barriers to better nutrition. 
• Multisectoral convergence. Community-based projects, if well designed, can en-
courage communities to seek services from various ministries and enable the conver-
gence to take place. This is important for nutrition, which requires a mix of sectoral 
interventions. 
• Flexibility of design. The determinants of malnutrition and the socio-cultural barri-
ers to change will vary by community. CDD approaches enable communities to adapt 
global knowledge to their particular situations. However, that adaptation usually re-
quires some external facilitation, e.g., through coaches.
NEPAL P125359 
COMMUNITY ACTION FOR NUTRITION PROJECT
Project development objective (PDO). 
The original PDO was “to improve 
attitudes and practices known to 
improve nutritional outcomes of women 
of reproductive age and children under 
the age of two.” The revised PDO is 
“to improve practices that contribute 
to reduced undernutrition of wom-
en of reproductive age and children 
under the age of two and to provide 
emergency nutrition and sanitation 
response to vulnerable populations 
in earthquake affected areas.” The 
project was restructured in 2015 to 
match the project’s results frame-
work with community choices.  
Results of interest  This project was 
developed specifically to address 
malnutrition in women of reproductive 
age and children under the age of two.  
Indicators  PDO level indicators, revised 
during restructuring and dropping the 
indicators that sought to measure atti-
tudes and refining others, include prac-
tices of pregnant women regarding iron 
and folic acid supplementation; breast-
feeding practices of mothers with chil-
dren 0–6 months of age; child feeding 
practices of households with children 
6–24 months of age; households 
reporting no smoke in the room while 
cooking; pregnant women reporting 
consuming animal-sourced protein in 
the previous day; households reporting 
using improved toilet facilities; mothers 
(of children aged 0–2) reporting always 
washing hands at critical times.
Implementation modalities  At the 
ward level, there is a multisectoral 
committee to approve plans and 
account for results. Communities get 
financing which could include awards 
for households / individuals for their 
achievements, e.g., for households using 
the pit latrine most consistently. The 
Rapid Results Approach, i.e., results 
in 100 days, is being used. There is a 
social mobilizer / coach hired through 
the NGO and contracted by the gov-
ernment through the project in every 
village development council (VDC). Most 
of the coaches are from the local com-
munity and most of them are women. 
The coach guides the communities, 
assisting them in devising a proposal to 
reduce malnutrition in the community.  
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• Flexible definition of community. Communities can be defined geographically, but 
particularly in countries where social exclusion is a challenge, communities can or-
ganize themselves and carry out projects on the basis of characteristics such as eth-
nicity, social class, caste, etc. Because some nutrition-related behaviors and barriers 
are specific to some communities, the flexibility inherent in CDD approaches should 
lead to better nutritional outcomes. CDD might be particularly effective in nutri-
tion because several factors affecting nutrition-related behaviors are socio-cultural. 
Those factors include gender discrimination, household resource distribution, wom-
en’s health-seeking behavior, and the feeding and eating practices during pregnancy 
and infancy. 
Potential Challenges 
• Communities do not always recognize nutrition as a problem. CDD programs sup-
port what communities select as priorities and this may not prioritize malnutrition 
as the most urgent community problem. Malnutrition may not be seen as a priority 
challenge partly because other pressing needs compete for attention, and partly be-
cause of lack of awareness about the magnitude of the malnutrition problem within 
the community, its causation, and available solutions. In communities where child-
hood undernutrition is widely prevalent, people may not recognize malnutrition as a 
critical problem since malnourished children are the norm.
• Risk of elite capture. CDD may not be suitable for communities where a feudal cul-
ture of leadership exists. In such communities, even so-called community engage-
ment may be captured by the most powerful members, defeating the idea of giving 
voice to the poor and vulnerable sections of the society. While a consultative process 
may occur during participatory planning, the process may not be truly inclusive.
• Alignment with national plans. Often communities will request support to build 
physical infrastructure such as health centers and schools. Unless the programs are 
strongly anchored in coordination mechanisms (which are often weak in developing 
countries), there is a risk of building infrastructures when a better solution might 
have been to address transportation problems (e.g., a bridge) to increase access to the 
infrastructures in neighboring communities. Increasingly, countries are developing 
GIS-enabled infrastructure maps (e.g., national health map) that should help CDD 
programs align with national infrastructure plans. This is not a particular risk for 
nutrition programs because community actions for nutrition do not require physical 
infrastructure. 
• Alignment with national systems. Similar to the infrastructure point made above, a CDD 
project may finance a school, but may not have the necessary linkages with the national 
system to ensure that teachers and a regular budget is assigned to operate the school.  
• Role / presence of the state. CDD programs need to have an effective accompanying 
communications strategy to ensure that communities are aware when a CDD pro-
gram is part of a government strategy to enhance service delivery. Otherwise, some 
governments may resist using the approach and risk being perceived as having been 
replaced by community-based organizations “to do the government’s job.” 
• Community contribution. As noted above, the community’s financial contribution 
should help enhance ownership and sustainability, but when criteria are strictly ap-
plied (e.g., insisting on a financial contribution instead of in-kind contribution) the 
poorest communities or the poorest members of communities may be excluded. This 
potential exclusion is highly relevant for nutrition because the poorest households 
tend to be the most affected by malnutrition. 
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• Capacity for nutrition. Even when community organizations and their members rec-
ognize nutrition as a priority, they do not always have the required knowledge to ana-
lyze the causes of malnutrition in their community or to select evidence-based inter-
ventions to reduce it. For example, communities sometimes decide to carry out growth 
monitoring, but this is insufficient to improve childhood malnutrition. It must be com-
plemented by appropriate nutrition counseling and / or supplementary feeding inter-
ventions demonstrated to caretakers, which is usually referred to as growth monitor-
ing and promotion (GMP). This capacity challenge has been remedied in some World 
Bank operations by using tools (e.g., menus of options / decision trees) and coaches to 
facilitate community participation processes, specifically on nutrition. 
• Communities are not always cohesive. Mobilizing communities could be a chal-
lenge, especially with governments that are reluctant to partner with NGOs and 
CBOs. Governments typically are not strong in community mobilization and need 
the help of NGOs or CBOs to accomplish it. Some geographic communities are not 
cohesive socially. In those cases, targeting by socially defined communities may be 
helpful or by introducing additional measures to improve social cohesion such as 
conflict prevention coaching in conflict-affected areas. 
• CDD programs are typically dispersed in thousands of small communities. Many of 
them may not have the necessary institutional arrangements, such as a development 
committee or a women’s group to mobilize and articulate their priorities or the ca-
pacity to develop plans and manage programs. This often requires strong technical 
support, usually through NGOs or CBOs. Monitoring the expenditures and results 
could become difficult to manage when the program is dispersed. Information and 
communication technologies are increasingly used to address this challenge. 
Examples of Country Experience 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, the Gambia, Ghana, India (state of Andhra Pradesh), 
Indonesia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Senegal, Nepal
 Household/Individual Level
•  Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) and Unconditional Cash  
Transfers (UCT) 
Definition  
• Cash transfers are provided directly to targeted (poor) individuals and households 
to reduce their vulnerability through consumption smoothing. When used for nutri-
tion, a secondary objective is to encourage behavioral changes that should result in 
improved nutritional outcomes. Such behavioral changes generally revolve around 
feeding and eating practices, girls’ education, caring for infants and children, hy-
giene, and accessing health and nutrition services.   
• Cash transfers can be conditional or unconditional, though the recent trend is toward 
the middle ground of soft conditions—behaviors are encouraged but compliance is 
not verified or enforced. When a nutritional objective is present, the transfers are 
combined with accompanying measures, such as communication campaigns and par-
enting classes, and the cash can be an effective “anchor” for nutrition messages.
• Conditional cash transfers (CCT) involve disbursements based on verified com-
pliance to the prescribed behavior, e.g., accessing institutional delivery, or bring-
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ing the baby in for growth monitoring or immunization, or nutrition counselling 
sessions. 
• Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) involve disbursements without a strict re-
quirement for a specific behavior. This approach is more suitable for behaviors 
that are difficult to verify, e.g., exclusive breastfeeding, or increased food intake 
during pregnancy. 
• Soft conditionalities. Even in operations designed as CCT, the conditionality is 
seldom strictly enforced. Beneficiaries are encouraged to attend parenting classes, 
growth monitoring and promotion sessions, cooking demonstrations and so on, but 
the payout is not conditioned upon their participation in such accompanying mea-
sures. Program evaluations suggest that soft conditionalities are just as effective as 
strict conditionalities. 
• Cash transfers have evolved over time, going beyond risk management towards oth-
er development goals, such as reducing malnutrition. If nutrition objectives are to be 
formally superimposed on CCT / UCT operations, it is vitally important to apply the 
relevant knowledge and skills in preparation, implementation, and monitoring, and 
to target the all-important first 1,000 days.  
Potential Strengths 
• Incentivizes behavior change. Cash transfers move the incentive to the intended 
beneficiaries, i.e., the individuals in households whose behavior needs to change to 
improve nutrition (caretakers and those who influence them), and can be very effec-
tive—if designed and implemented well. 
• Targeting the most vulnerable. Cash transfer programs rely on rigorous systems to 
target the most vulnerable, most often through a proxy means test that identifies the 
income poor. Household surveys have shown that these beneficiaries are more likely 
to be malnourished. Using the targeting system of cash transfer programs therefore 
could help to use more efficiently the scarce resources available for nutrition, espe-
cially for preventing undernutrition.
MALI P127328 
EMERGENCY SAFETY NETS PROJECT (JIGISÉMÉJIRI) 
Project development objective (PDO). 
To provide targeted cash transfers to 
the poor and food insecure households 
and to establish the building blocks 
for a national safety net system. 
 
Results of interest  Poverty allevia-
tion; safety net for the poor and food 
insecure; improving living conditions. 
Increasing access to social services. 
Nutrition is seen as a side effect. A 
nutrition program is being piloted as 
part of this operation. Every under-five 
child and pregnant women will receive 
a nutritional supplement (powdered 
milk + iron supplement + vitamin A), 
along with nutrition education. 
Indicators  Nutrition-specific indica-
tors include poor households / children 
receiving the nutritional package, i.e., 
the powder + education; households 
participating in the nutritional infor-
mation session; households improving 
food consumption score, i.e., weight-
ed score of 20 categories of food.
Operational modality  Unconditional 
cash transfer (UCT) combined with 
behavior change communication (BCC) 
in the five regions of the south—105 
to110 communities of 703 communities 
in the country. The cash transferred 
to poor household is accompanied by 
services and education / information. 
The operation is linked to the National 
Health Insurance. The UCT targets the 
poor, but non-poor households can 
participate in the information session at 
the community level. A total of 62,000 
households have been identified to be 
reached by July 2016. Consideration is 
being given to linking the beneficiaries 
of the UCT with the health program 
so that growth monitoring could be 
added to the operation. On average, 70 
percent of the transfer is spent on food.
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• Filling a resource gap. Cash transfers are an important part of a national nutrition 
strategy because— at least for the poorest and most vulnerable households—the avail-
ability of financial resources is a determinant of malnutrition.  The cash will enable 
these households to purchase a balanced and safe diet (which is more expensive than 
the typical diets consumed by the poor) and health services. The cash could also free 
up time for caretakers to ensure children received adequate breastfeeding and com-
plementary feeding. 
• Anchoring behavior change messages. The cash transfer itself can serve as an “an-
chor” for nutrition messages, i.e., to capture the attention of household members to 
key nutrition messages that they might otherwise not notice due to competing prior-
ities in their complex lives.
• Addressing gender dynamics. Cash transfer programs can be designed to correct 
household gender imbalances by empowering women. For example, the cash trans-
fers are generally handed out to women rather than to the household head. This is 
likely to benefit nutrition (independent of whether or not nutrition messages are in-
cluded with the cash transfer) because gender inequality is often a strong determinant 
of malnutrition. 
• Efficiency. Direct transfers to individuals through cash transfer programs avoid elite 
capture and other inefficiencies that diminish the proportion of resources that reach 
households. For example, it may be more efficient to provide a household with a cash 
transfer and information encouraging them to purchase a product such as micronutri-
ent powders or zinc tablets from the market rather than providing these same inputs 
for free through the public health system. The act of purchasing would create owner-
ship for the effective use of the product. 
• Rapid response capability. Cash transfer programs provide a platform for rapidly de-
ploying an emergency response to crises such as floods, earthquakes, etc. Rapid de-
ployment could help prevent or reduce the severity of the malnutrition which typical-
ly accompanies emergency situations.
• Strong information systems. Cash transfer programs require strong information sys-
tems to identify beneficiaries, track payments and, in the case of conditional transfers, 
to communicate the conditionalities or “co-responsibilities,” and to verify compliance. 
These same information systems can be used to communicate key nutrition messages. 
• Political visibility. Cash transfer programs tend to be highly visible and usually ben-
efit from strong political support. Adding a nutrition objective to a cash transfer pro-
gram could also raise the profile of nutrition with policy-makers.
Potential Challenges 
• Requires strong management capacity and good governance. Cash transfer programs 
require strong management arrangements to ensure effective administration of the 
cash transfer, mitigating moral hazard, preventing leakage of the cash, and monitoring 
actual compliance in the case of conditional cash transfers. This capacity requirement 
can be a challenge in some countries. 
• Limited feedback loops from UCTs. While UCTs are easier to administer, they do not 
have built-in mechanisms to determine whether the desired behavior change has been 
achieved. Separate surveys or other ways of collecting data may therefore be required. 
• For CCTs, insure the service which constitutes the condition is available. The supply 
of nutrition-related services is often a constraint in countries where malnutrition is 
highly prevalent. An incentive to the providers of the service in question may be help-
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ful. In effect, such cases could combine a demand-side incentive though the CCT with 
PBF to incentivize the supply side. This increases the complexity and potentially the 
cost of the intervention.
• Potential negative impact on intrinsic motivation. When CCT is used to increase the 
utilization of predetermined services, the use of cash alone may affect what otherwise 
may have been an intrinsic motivation to seek a service. It may be possible that the 
prescribed services would not be highly valued by the community and that they may 
consider themselves to simply be paid to use the services, rather than fully valuing the 
usefulness of the service.
• Sometimes financial incentives may not be enough to overcome entrenched beliefs 
and socio-cultural barriers. It is often the case that the barriers to behavior change 
lie at the community level where norms are set.  Therefore, information, education, 
and communication campaigns need to accompany any type of transfers that seek to 
change behaviors, and perhaps also community-based incentives.  
• Risk that the behavior change attained by a cash transfer program may not be sus-
tained after the incentive stops. In nutrition programs, if the cash was intended to 
finance food security and access to health services, it may be necessary to ensure con-
tinued availability of resources over relatively long periods. However, in a cash trans-
fer program, which targeted households with children during the first 1,000 days, 
households could enter the program for a relatively shorter time. Cash transfer pro-
grams are increasingly focusing on concurrently building the capacity of households 
to become more productive so as to eventually “graduate” and become economically 
independent.  
Examples of Country Experience 
Bangladesh, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guatema-
la, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, Lesotho,  Madagascar, 
Mali, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Tanzania 
 
• Public Works Programs (PWP)
Definition 
• A public works program (PWP) involves the provision of temporary paid employ-
ment by the creation of predominantly public goods for targeted beneficiaries. The 
works are generally labor intensive and require few or no skills.
• PWP have traditionally financed the construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure 
(e.g., feeder roads, small dams, etc.) as well as works to preserve the environment 
(e.g., reforestation, terracing, etc.). However, these programs have started financing 
other forms of employment, which are more directly relevant for nutrition, such as 
agriculture and child care.
• A PWP functions as a form of productive social safety net by providing an income to 
targeted households or individuals in exchange for their labor. Payments can be in-kind 
or, more frequently, in cash. Wages are set sufficiently low to avoid substitution effects 
with other employment. Targeting is done either on the basis of income measures (e.g., 
proxy means test) or by self-targeting, by setting the wage sufficiently low to attract 
only poor people. Some programs intentionally target women, or have women quotas, 
and provide complementary services (e.g., child care) to enable their participation. 
• In light of the obvious limitations of temporary employment, PWP are increasingly pro-
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viding complementary services aimed at helping beneficiaries find sustainable liveli-
hoods. They include various types of training, “forced” savings, and matching grants. 
• The programs can be used as part of an overall national social protection strategy and 
/ or provided in response to a humanitarian crisis.
Potential Strengths 
• Target the poor. In addition to the poverty targeting (e.g., proxy means test), when 
the wages are set at the right level, PWPs create a self-targeting mechanism which 
tends to work well because only those poor enough to consider the low wages at-
tractive will present themselves for work. Because of the link between poverty and 
nutrition, the participants of PWPs are more likely to belong to households with high 
levels of malnutrition. 
• Can provide a platform to transmit nutrition messages and build skills. Increasingly, 
PWPs have a longer-term vision and contain skills development training to enable the 
individuals to overcome the barriers that are keeping them trapped in poverty. The 
training sessions offer a platform to transmit information about nutrition. 
• Could have sustainable livelihoods component linked to nutrition-related microen-
terprises. The training and savings component of a PWP could encourage participants 
to develop microenterprises to meet specific nutrition needs of the community. For 
example, participants could develop local low-cost vitamin fortified complementary 
food for children.
• Works can build nutrition-related infrastructure. Even a more traditional PWP 
could apply a nutrition lens in the selection of the infrastructure that would be built or 
rehabilitated. Priorities could include, for example, latrines for girls at schools (to prolong 
school attendance for girls), infrastructure for irrigation, and storage of vitamin rich crops. 
• Good match with intrinsic motivation.  Because they have worked for their wage, the 
incentive may have less negative impact on intrinsic motivation.  Participants would 
feel they have earned their incentive, thus enhancing the sense of pride and self-re-
spect among the beneficiaries.
• Could provide a platform for community processes. Inasmuch as PWPs are opportu-
nities for people to get together and work together, they could be used as a platform 
to start organizing the community for nutritionally minded collective action, e.g., re-
moving conditions that enable mosquitos to breed and transmit malaria or improving 
access to water and the sanitary environment. The training provided by the program 
could provide a good starting point.
• Potential for inter-sectoral convergence. PWPs provide a great opportunity for in-
ter-sectoral action. The benefits go beyond health or nutrition and could yield broader 
developmental impact. If a PWP sets itself an objective to contribute to improving nu-
trition, it can forge useful linkages with other relevant sectors. For example, the PWP 
can partner with the health system to identify malnourished kids in the families of the 
beneficiary workers, and provide nutrition services where required.
• Flexibility for households. If payments are in cash, households will dispose of addi-
tional income to spend freely. When combined with appropriate educational programs, 
the additional income could be put to good use and enhance food security and house-
hold nutrition status.
• Non-controversial entry point for nutrition. In countries that may have sensitivities 
related to their malnutrition rates, combining nutrition interventions into an existing 
PWP may be a good way to start remedying the problem.
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Potential Challenges  
• Does not reach those who cannot work. Those who are unable to work because of age, 
health status or family responsibilities are excluded from PWPs.  So, complementary 
programs such as cash transfers should be available to reach those households. 
• No guarantees that nutrition behaviors will improve. Payments are generally given to 
the workers, which in most cases mean payments will go to men. While poor women 
tend to prioritize investments in human capital when they obtain additional income—
including better quality food, education and health services (all critical inputs for good 
nutrition) —this is less true when the income is controlled by men, especially if the 
PWP does not include communication on nutrition as an accompanying measure.  
• Labor-intensive works can be energy intensive and could actually aggravate mal-
nutrition. Most PWPs require hard physical labor, and the additional food pur-
chased with the wages may not offset the caloric loss (or the worker may simply not 
increase his / her food intake and use the extra money for something else). In this 
situation, aggravating a low body mass index situation is a risk for participants. This 
poses a problem especially for women of child bearing age and would lead to low 
birth weight babies.
• May be difficult to change the mindset. Some public works agencies are accus-
tomed to infrastructure work. It is a mindset change to have them work on social 
sector activities.
• Horizon tends to be short-term. In most cases, beneficiaries of PWP only work for a 
few months (4–6). There is therefore a risk that beneficiaries will focus only on short-
term employment and the current earning needs of their households.  
• Nutrition may not be recognized as a priority. Many of these social safety net pro-
grams may not prioritize nutrition in their results monitoring. They therefore may 
not result in nutritional improvements even if income poverty is alleviated.
ETHIOPIA P146883 
PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NETS PROJECT 4 (PSNP-4) 
Project development objective (PDO). 
To increase access to safety net and 
disaster risk management systems, 
complementary livelihoods services 
and nutrition support for food inse-
cure households in rural Ethiopia.
Results of interest. Improved house-
hold food security, livelihoods and 
nutrition, and enhanced household 
and community resilience to shocks.  
Indicators  At the PDO-level, the project 
measures progress in transition to a so-
cial protection system; progress towards 
developing improved early warning 
triggers and agreed response mecha-
nisms; the net number of months of food 
insecurity for program participants; 
increase in average value of household 
assets; and access of client households 
to community-based nutrition services, 
including behavioral change communi-
cation provided under the national nutri-
tion program. At the intermediate level, 
the project includes a few nutrition-spe-
cific indicators: clients reporting that 
they can provide adequate meals for 
their family for 12 months a year (male / 
female); transfers that have a value of at 
least 15 kg of cereals and 4 kg of pulses. 
 
Operational modality  Public works 
program with cash or food is given. The 
cash component is the equivalent of 
2,100 calories worth of food, cash or 
e-payment. 80 percent of the house-
holds are paid in return for working in 
the public works. But these public works 
programs include attending behavior 
change sessions. Work requirements 
are exempted for pregnant women and 
those with young children. 20 percent 
of the households receive UCT (house-
holds without able-bodied members). 
The incentives are “soft” (encourag-
ing) incentives / “nudges” not “hard” 
conditions. There has been an evolution 
of increasing attention to nutrition 
under PSNP. In the first PSNP, the only 
conditionality was that Ethiopia should 
have a nutrition policy. In PSNP-4, there 
is much more nutrition sensitivity.  
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• Potential leakage and corruption. In some countries these PWPs are a source of 
corruption through measures such as falsification of worker lists, etc. The problem 
tends to be more acute when payment is in-kind rather than through cash payments 
made directly to individual bank accounts.
Examples of Country Experience 
Argentina, Bangladesh, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Democratic Republic of Congo
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Non-Financial Incentives
Effective interventions to achieve nutritional impact will require a mix of financial and non-fi-
nancial incentives. This section provides examples of non-financial incentives that could be con-
sidered at each level of the system. This is not a comprehensive list of non-financial incentives. 
An important first step in selecting non-financial incentives, as well as financial incentives, is to 
define a clear theory of change.12  It is also critical to understand the social environment in which 
the interventions will be introduced, including the norms and mental models of the stakeholders 
and beneficiaries. We recommend that readers consult the World Development Report 2015: Mind, 
Society, and Behavior for a more detailed discussion about this topic, which should inspire the 
selection of appropriate intervention design to best use non-financial incentives. 
 National and Sub-National
• Global SUN movement: Prestige of joining “Scaling Up Nutrition / SUN” movement and 
the personal satisfaction related to learning from the SUN tools and networks.
• Costing data: Information on cost-effectiveness of nutrition interventions motivates 
decision-makers to invest for good social returns, e.g., World Bank costing studies.
• Social change campaigns: Visibility of behavior change campaigns can provide social 
capital for political leaders.
• Bilateral dialogue: When international donors include nutrition as part of their overall 
bilateral political dialogue, high-level decision-makers may be motivated, or in some cases 
coerced, to take action.
• Rankings: International rankings, e.g., Human Development Index, can serve as motivators.
• Visits from leaders / summits: World leaders’ visits and international summits (e.g., World 
Bank meeting on stunting in October 2016) can draw attention to malnutrition and thus 
motivate policy-makers either to seek visibility or to avoid being shamed.
• Campaigns and reports: International campaigns and reports, e.g., Global Nutrition Report, 
can cast attention on the issue. Related in-country media coverage and debates can motivate 
leaders and policy-makers to take action.
12 See Valters, 2015.
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• Global events: Events such as World Food Day and the related media coverage can motivate 
leaders and policy-makers to show what they have achieved in nutrition.
• Regular use of data: Annual “nutrition report cards” can generate interest from a range of 
stakeholders and motivate action. These require more robust data systems for nutrition than 
those currently in place.
• Brand recognition: Private companies can get motivated to take action on malnutrition 
because it will boost their brand.  
• Learning opportunities: Leaders, policy-makers and other stakeholders such as journalists 
can be motivated to take action on nutrition through learning events such as conferences and 
targeted training programs (e.g., programs targeted at parliamentarians and media leaders).
• Supportive supervision: Program implementers at the national and sub-national level 
could be motivated by the feedback they receive through supervision.
• Recognition: Awards, either to individual leaders or to countries, can be powerful motivators. 
 Health Facility
• Information tools: Having appealing information tools could motivate health workers to 
undertake good nutrition counseling.  
• Knowledge: Well-trained health workers will be more motivated to include nutrition as 
part of a medical consultation. Too often, nutrition is missing from pre-service or in-ser-
vice training of health workers. 
• Mass media campaigns: While these campaigns are usually aimed primarily at households, 
they have been shown to also have a positive impact on the motivation of health workers. 
• Supportive supervision: Health workers could be motivated by the feedback they receive 
through regular supervision.
• Visibility: A nutrition program could be designed to provide visibility for health facility 
workers, conferring them status in the community and possibilities of promotion into high-
er levels of the health system.
• Recognition: Awards are important motivators; these could be for individual workers or for 
entire health facilities.
• Benchmarking: The use of data to establish performance standards and then using these 
standards to compare health facilities, as done in PBF, could be a motivator for health fa-
cility workers.
• Availability of supplies: Without specific supplies, e.g., zinc supplements, some nutrition 
services cannot be offered. Long periods of stock outs of these supplies could demotivate 
workers to provide these services. Conversely, the availability of the supply could serve as 
a reminder that the services should be offered.  
 Community
• Information tools: Having appealing information tools could motivate the community health 
worker or other community platforms to undertake good nutrition counseling. ICT tools ap-
pear to boost the status of the community health worker in communities where tools such as 
tablets and smart phones are still a novelty.
• Knowledge: Community workers are more motivated when they feel they have knowledge 
they can bring to the community. For example, the community is motivated by knowledge 
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that they can take collective action in areas such as removing the conditions required for the 
transmission of malaria.
• Shame: Some social norms can be shifted through shaming, e.g., shifting the norms surround-
ing the role of men in child feeding practices, or the norms around open defecation. 
• Data: Communities could be motivated by a sense of accomplishment that would come from 
knowing that their children are growing better or have lower levels of anemia. This would re-
quire having data platforms that send this signal to communities on a regular basis.
• Positive deviance: Positive deviance analysis, i.e., identifying households in the community 
where children are developing normally despite having access to similar resources, can be 
motivating to communities because it shows them that they have the ability to improve their 
situation with minimal need for external resources. 
• Visibility: Highly visible programs, e.g., vitamin A distributions, can be motivating both for 
caretakers and for workers and thus reach high levels of coverage.
• Priority access to services: In some countries, community health workers may not receive a 
financial payment, but they have priority access to some free services such as health care and 
credit. This can serve as an important motivator, particularly if these services do not have the 
ability to cover the entire community. 
• Mass media campaigns: While these campaigns are usually aimed primarily at households, 
they have been shown to also have a positive impact on the motivation of community workers.
• Recognition: Awards and other forms of recognition, either to individual workers or to entire 
communities, can serve as important motivators. An example is conferring on a community 
the status of being “open defecation free.”
 Households
• Information: Parents who learn that well-nourished children perform better in school and 
earn more during their adult years are motivated to take action. Often caretakers are not 
performing certain behaviors because they do not know the benefits of the behavior.
• Growth monitoring: If accompanied by appropriate counseling, growth monitoring can 
be a powerful tool to motivate parents to take action when their child is growth faltering.
• Mass media campaigns: While these campaigns are usually aimed primarily at households, 
they have been shown to also have a positive impact on the motivation of health workers.
• Nudges: Encouraging households that receive a cash payment either as part of a cash trans-
fer program or as part of a public works program could motivate parents to modify their 
consumption patterns in favor of services and food that improve the nutritional status of 
women and children in the household. 
• Availability of a product: When a product such as micronutrient powders to fortify a child’s 
food directly on the plate is available in the household, it can serve as a motivator to change 
certain behaviors, in this case, starting complementary feeding at six-months of age. 
• Recognition of status: Nutrition-related behaviors in a household involve several individ-
uals, but in the past, most messages have been directed mainly at the mother. Recognizing 
that the grandmother and the father are important decision makers and directly involving 
them in interventions can serve as motivators for behavior change. 
• Gender: Actions to increase the agency of women within the household are important mo-
tivators for these women, which can have an impact on malnutrition. 
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Gaps to Consider when Integrating  
Nutrition in World Bank Operations
In most countries, what will be needed to reinforce the nutrition system will exceed available 
resources. An important first step for a World Bank team is to assess the various aspects of the nu-
trition system to gauge the priority gaps and to determine where and how the World Bank could 
add the most value. In this process, it is important to clearly understand what other partners are 
currently doing or planning for nutrition programming.  
Value Added of the World Bank
The World Bank’s value proposition will depend on a range of factors, including the overall level 
of development of the nutrition system, the results of the gap analysis, the level of resources and 
government capacity, and the activities and plans of its development partners. Some areas that 
are often at the core of the World Bank’s value proposition in nutrition include: 
i. Positioning nutrition at the highest levels as an economic development issue, e.g., Prime 
Minister, Minister of Finance 
ii. Convening a range of development partners, including the private sector
iii. Supporting the design of large-scale programs
iv. Strengthening service delivery systems, e.g., information systems, supply and logistics sys-
tems, procurement and financial management systems
v. Financing large-scale programs
vi. Supporting the use of evidence for decision making, including costing data and economic 
analysis
vii. Drawing on global experience of what is effective in all the nutrition-related sectors
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When conducting this analysis, World Bank teams may also find it useful to consult the tools 
developed by the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement (see Annex 2 references). While the 
specific decision pathway for prioritizing actions is highly dependent on the country context, 
questions that should be asked include the following.
Policy Environment
• Is there sufficient political support for nutrition from a wide range of stakeholders?
 Ʌ Possible actions: stakeholder survey, advocacy strategy, strategic communications 
plan.
• Are there clear champions for nutrition? Are there opponents? What are their interests?
 Ʌ Possible actions: political economy analysis, advocacy strategy, strategic communi-
cations plan.
• Is there a common narrative on the causes of and solutions for malnutrition in the country?
 Ʌ Possible actions: develop a common narrative document based on the analysis of the 
determinants of malnutrition, e.g., secondary analysis of Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS) and other surveys; ensure full ownership of the narrative by all rele-
vant stakeholders.
• Does the country have an evidence-based nutrition policy and strategy?
 Ʌ Possible actions: TA for development / updating the policy and strategy.
• Are the related legal instruments in place, e.g., regulations for food fortification?
 Ʌ Possible actions: TA for the development of the legal instruments.
• Is there sufficient willingness and capacity to enforce regulations for nutrition?
 Ʌ Possible actions: political economy analysis, TA to reinforce capacity for regulation.
Governance and Institutional
• Is there sufficiently strong accountability for achieving nutrition results?
 Ʌ Possible actions: annual scorecard, media engagement.
• How aware is the general population of nutrition issues?
 Ʌ Possible actions: national media campaign targeting the most critical nutrition-re-
lated behaviors.
• Do regulatory systems function well?
 Ʌ Possible actions: political economy analysis of specific regulatory systems, e.g., food 
fortification and food safety regulations, address specific barriers such as capacity, 
corruption, etc. 
Financing
• Is nutrition sufficiently financed? Is the financing of nutrition well understood?
 Ʌ Possible action: Public expenditure review and fiscal space analysis.
• Have clear priorities been set for nutrition financing?
 Ʌ Possible action: Costing analysis that identifies cost and benefits of priority interven-
tions and models various scenarios for scaling up.
• Is nutrition well reflected in the annual planning process, e.g., annual health plans, annual 
agriculture plans?
 Ʌ Possible actions: TA to support integration of nutrition in the planning process.
• Is adequate financing allocated to nutrition by the government and development partners?
 Ʌ Possible actions: advocacy, public expenditure review, TA for participatory budgeting. 
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Partnerships
• Is there a common platform for coordination, led by a senior government official, optimal-
ly an individual above sectoral ministries, e.g., in the Prime Minister or President’s Office?
 Ʌ Possible actions: advocacy to create the platform, e.g., obtain Prime Minister com-
mitment, TA and financial support to establish a secretariat for coordination.
• Has the country joined the SUN movement? Are the SUN networks functional, i.e., do-
nors, multilaterals, private sector, civil society?
 Ʌ Potential actions: advocacy to have the country join SUN, World Bank to join donors 
group, financing of TA for the coordination structure, e.g., a Secretariat.
• How engaged is the private sector in nutrition?
 Ʌ Possible actions: specific engagement strategy for the private sector, ensuring regula-
tory framework incentivizes the private sector to engage.
• Are national media engaged with the issue?
 Ʌ Potential actions: training for leading journalists on the fundamentals of nutrition, 
organizing media debates on the issue.
• Who are the leading academics generating knowledge on nutrition in the country? Are 
they aligned with global best practice in the field?
 Ʌ Potential actions: financing for key researchers to participate in global nutrition 
conferences, TA to support leading universities, e.g., developing or reinforcing the 
capacity of research and teaching programs on agriculture so they become nutri-
tion-sensitive.
• What role is civil society playing?
 Ʌ Possible actions: TA to engage civil society organizations that are not working on the 
issue, e.g., sensitization, technical assistance for those who want to develop advocacy 
or programs, challenge fund to incentivize innovations in program delivery, contract-
ing community-based organizations for service delivery, e.g., performance-based 
contracting or performance-based financing.
Information, Monitoring, and Learning
• Is there a common results framework for nutrition?
 Ʌ Possible actions: TA to develop the common results framework, political analysis to 
understand the interests of different stakeholders.
• How recently was national / sub-national information collected on nutritional status and 
program implementation?
 Ʌ Possible actions: finance a national nutrition survey; ensure that nutrition is well cov-
ered in household surveys such as Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), poverty surveys, etc.
• What system is in place to produce routine data on nutrition, i.e., on nutritional status and 
on program implementation?
 Ʌ Potential actions: review which nutrition indicators are included in the health in-
formation management system (HMIS) and other sectoral management information 
systems, TA to enhance the utilization of the data for decision making, establishment 
of a “light” sentinel site data collection system for nutrition.
• Are there opportunities for the government and development partners to come together to 
learn about effective programs?
 Ʌ Potential actions: support a national institution, e.g., academic or civil society, to 
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undertake regular reviews of “good practices” and to organize workshops to share 
lessons. The good practice reviews can serve as an incentive for implementers to 
document more systematically their experience. 
Planning and Implementation Capacity 
• Do officials at the national and sub-national, e.g., district, levels have sufficient capacity to 
plan and monitor nutrition interventions?
 Ʌ Possible actions: training, results-based contracts.
• Do health workers have sufficient capacity to implement nutrition interventions?
 Ʌ Possible actions: training and incentives for workers.
• Does the country have a cadre of community health and nutrition workers? Do other com-
munity platforms exist?
 Ʌ Possible actions: TA for policy and guidelines on community-based services; training 
and incentives for community workers.
Service Delivery
• Is there consensus on a “priority package” of nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive in-
terventions that needs to be financed and scaled up?
 Ʌ Possible actions: evidence review, taking into consideration specific characteristics 
of the country, costing of interventions and benefits, TA for the development of stra-
tegic and implementation plans, study tours / workshops to learn from other coun-
tries’ experiences.
• What is the current coverage of nutrition-specific interventions (see Table 1)?
 Ʌ Possible actions: support for the scale up of specific low coverage interventions. This 
is usually through the health sector, but some interventions could be implemented 
through other sectors.
• Are the agriculture / water and sanitation / education / social protection systems nutri-
tion-sensitive? Has a theory of change for nutrition been developed in each sector? Does 
each system specifically track nutrition-related results?
 Ʌ Possible actions: develop theory of change, identify a key actions and support im-
plementation, including measurement of nutrition-related results, support rigorous 
evaluation of interventions that are not yet supported by evidence.
Specific Targeting Measures
• What is the social-economic composition of the population? Are there specific groups that 
tend to suffer from social exclusion? How many languages are required to communicate 
effectively with the population? How much cultural variation would be expected in the 
population, e.g., taboos related to maternal and child feeding?
 Ʌ Possible actions: build in flexibility in the interventions so they are delivered appro-
priately to different groups, e.g., materials in different languages, community–based 
approaches that leave the community flexibility on how to address certain challeng-
es so they are appropriate for their own group, targeting of specific groups, which are 
often socially excluded (and tracking results separately). 
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• What are the gender dynamics in the population?
 Ʌ Possible actions: ensure interventions are gender sensitive; include interventions to 
improve gender sensitivity; target interventions to specific genders, e.g., men’s groups 
to discuss malnutrition, targeting of grandmothers. 
Supplies and Logistics
• Do health facilities and community platforms have sufficient commodities e.g., supple-
ments, information materials, and weighing scales, to deliver nutrition interventions?  
 Ʌ Possible actions: finance gaps in commodities, strengthening the supply and logistics 
system capacity to forecast requirements and manage stocks.
• Does the supply and logistics system need reinforcement to handle nutrition-related com-
modities?
 Ʌ Possible actions: TA to strengthen the supply and logistics system, inclusion of nutri-
tion commodities in performance-based contracts for the supply chain.
Issues to Consider when Prioritizing
How should a World Bank team prioritize the wide range of potential nutrition actions? There is 
not one simple answer, but some of the following principles could guide the prioritization.
Identify the results of interest, theory of change, and critical bottlenecks. The starting point 
for project planning should be (a) to identify clearly the project’s targeted results, e.g., improved 
behaviors for infant and young child feeding or increases in coverage of key nutrition services, 
(b) to articulate a clear theory of change on how to achieve the results, and then (c) to address 
the most critical bottlenecks to achieving the results. The results of interest could be directly 
related to beneficiaries in the critical 1,000 day window, or they could be other types of results, 
such as systems strengthening, political commitment, etc. The bottlenecks will vary based on the 
environment in which the project will be implemented. The list of questions above would help 
identify the main potential bottlenecks.
Focus on scaling up where the evidence is strongest. The evidence is currently strongest for 
nutrition-specific interventions but their coverage is often still suboptimal in many countries. 
Priority should be given to scaling up nutrition-specific interventions, while at the same time 
developing approaches to deliver nutrition-sensitive interventions. Particularly in the latter case, 
investments should be made to evaluate and document nutrition interventions to contribute to 
the operational evidence base.
Understand the political economy and be opportunistic. Be clear on the opportunities that may 
exist at different times to support specific aspects of nutrition in a country. Some influential ac-
tors may be pushing for health system reforms, e.g., strengthening of the supply system of the 
health management information system (HMIS), in which nutrition could be included. During 
some periods, such as during the lead up to elections, it tends to be politically easier to implement 
more visible initiatives, e.g., treatment of severe acute malnutrition, micronutrient supplemen-
tation campaigns, etc. It is important to understand and seize such opportunities to advance a 
nutrition agenda. It is also possible to conduct political economy analysis to help identify how to 
proactively create opportunities to implement nutrition advocacy strategies.
Achieve a balance between reaching target beneficiaries and systems strengthening. To reduce 
child stunting, maternal malnutrition, and micronutrient deficiencies, the quantity and quality 
of services—including messages—that reach the intended beneficiaries, e.g., women and chil-
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dren during the first 1,000 days, will need to be the main focus. It is unlikely that nutrition ser-
vices would be delivered in a void. Therefore, reinforcing the systems that deliver the services 
is also necessary. System strengthening will also help to enhance sustainability. Activities to 
strengthen systems should be balanced with activities enabling service delivery to the targeted 
beneficiaries. In nutrition, as in public health more broadly, a dichotomy exists between propo-
nents of “campaign-style” delivery, which achieves high levels of equitable coverage, and advo-
cates of systems strengthening. It may be more appropriate to merge the two positions, whereby 
campaigns at regular intervals become a routine outreach approach to extend the delivery of 
health services. 
Harmonize with development partners and identify the value proposition for the World Bank. 
The World Bank is just one of the development partners active in nutrition programming in 
developing countries (see section below). If the country is a member of the global Scaling Up 
Nutrition (SUN) movement, it is likely that the partners are organized into specific networks as 
follows: donors, including the World Bank, UN agencies, civil society, and business. An import-
ant step in prioritizing the focus of World Bank support is to map out what each development 
partner is doing and what is the Bank’s comparative advantage.   
Targeting of Nutrition Interventions
To the extent possible, nutrition interventions should be targeted to maximize effi-
ciency. The following types of targeting need to be considered.
• Age: Interventions need to target women and children during the first 1,000 
days from conception to the child’s second birthday. Maternal nutrition inter-
ventions should include adolescent girls, e.g., to delay age of first pregnancy, 
address adolescent anemia before pregnancy, etc. 
• Socio-economic: While households from all income quintiles are affected 
by malnutrition, those from the poorest two quintiles are consistently more 
affected, and they also tend to have less access to health services. Special mea-
sures should be taken to ensure that services reach these poorer households. 
Similarly, communities who suffer from social exclusion should be targeted.
• Gender: While there are no longer significant differences in nutritional 
status of young girls versus young boys, gender dynamics amongst adults in 
the household continue to be a strong determining factor of malnutrition for 
women and children in the household. In recent decades, much focus has been 
given to targeting women in gender empowerment interventions for nutrition, 
which has often left out men. The emphasis needs to be re-shifted to a “whole 
household” approach ensuring that those who wield the most power, often the 
men and the grandmothers, are included in the discussions.
• Opinion leaders: Behavior change is a core intervention to achieve most nutrition 
results. Community members are more likely to adopt new behaviors if a leader in their 
community— either their geographic or their social community —has already adopted the 
behavior. Programs should target these opinion leaders first. For example, it may be more 
effective to also target wealthier individuals in communications for a new product such as 
micronutrient powders, not only because their children would benefit, but also because of 
the demonstration effect they will have on less wealthy households.
• Interventions: Some nutrition interventions, by their very nature, are targeted at spe-
cific groups. Iron tablets are targeted at pregnant women and adolescent girls, zinc sup-
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plements for treating diarrhea are targeted at children suffering from diarrhea, vitamin A 
supplementation is targeted at children aged six to 59 months, etc. 
• Geographic: Some areas within countries are often more heavily affected by malnutri-
tion, and these could be targeted. When selecting geographic areas to target, other factors 
should also be considered, such as the presence of other development partners, the ease 
of implementation and thus likelihood of success, and the political interest in some areas, 
which would provide visibility for results. 
52 Incentivizing Nutrition: A Practitioner’s CompendiumCONCLUSIONS 52
INDICATORS FOR INCENTIVE-BASED OPERATIONS WITH NUTRITION RESULTS 53
Monitoring indicators should be SMART: Specific, Measurable, Attributable, Realistic / Rel-
evant and Time-Bound. This is even more important when incentive payments are linked to 
achieving results. Although indicators could connote outputs or outcomes, it is generally more 
appropriate to link incentive payments to outputs or intermediate outcomes—rather than to final 
nutritional status outcomes. Improvements in nutritional status take much longer to materialize, 
and could be affected by factors beyond the control of whoever is to be incentivized. While direct 
measures of nutrition results are preferable, proxies may have to be used.
To target the incentive instrument to the right behaviors, a clear theory of change needs to be 
formulated and borne in mind. The results chain should include actions / behaviors at various 
levels, so that appropriate behaviors are incentivized at the relevant levels. The theory of change 
would take account of policies and programs at the government levels, supply-side readiness at 
the service delivery levels, the social mobilization and empowerment at the community level, and 
the eating / feeding / caring behaviors at the household and individual level. The ability to verify 
the achievement of targets—and to counter verify independently as necessary—is often a critical 
factor in selecting financial incentive indicators. 
The basic framework for the causation of malnutrition is the starting point for the theory of 
change. Three broad sets of determinants are often cited as resulting in good or bad nutrition. 
They are household food security, access to quality health care services, and behavioral factors—gen-
erally referred to as the triad of food, health, and care. Therefore, the policies, programs, services, 
and behaviors that affect any of these three sets of determinants need to be clearly identified, and 
the incentive instruments need to be applied at the appropriate levels where the instruments are 
expected to be effective.
Indicators for Incentive-Based  
Operations with Nutrition Results
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 Government Level
•  Development policy financing
Development policy financing indicators can incentivize behaviors relating to nutrition-sen-
sitive policies, budgeting, and other stewardship functions, such as multisectoral coordi-
nation and accountability, as well as legislation, and achievement of plans. The incentive 
would “wedge” nutrition into the overall national and subnational policy and stewardship 
agenda. Potential indicators at this level include:  
• Increased allocation and expenditure on programs / activities contributing to nutri-
tion (nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive)
• Preparation, approval, and adoption of a comprehensive nutrition strategy, and a ful-
ly costed national action plan, reflected clearly in the budget. Indicators could also 
track major milestones in the implementation of the strategy
• Establishment and functioning of a high-level multisectoral coordination structure
• Establishment of integrated management information systems that include appro-
priate data on nutrition indicators
• Nutrition-sensitive agricultural policies 
• Legislation mandating appropriate food fortification with micronutrients
• Legislation on food safety
• Legislation on nutritional content of certain foods, e.g., banning sugary drinks
• Existence and functioning of enforcement mechanisms for regulation of food fortifi-
cation, food safety, nutritional contents of food, etc. 
• Social safety net programs that are nutrition-sensitive, that go beyond income gen-
eration, and promote better household behaviors aimed at improved nutrition status
• Education policy and programs that are sensitive to nutrition, such as an educational 
curriculum that includes substantive nutrition content and a program of extracurric-
ular activities on behavior change for nutrition
• Labor laws are changed to mandate crèches and breastfeeding rooms for female em-
ployees
• Country-specific reform measures, e.g., improved targeting measures to focus on the 
first 1,000 days
•  Program for Results (PforR / DLI) and Performance Based Budgeting (PBB)
PforR / DLI and PBB can use a combination of policy reform indicators (see above), as well 
as service delivery indicators. The specific service delivery indicators would depend on 
which services need to be incentivized the most—keeping in mind factors such as strength 
of evidence, cost-effectiveness, affordability, low coverage, relative newness of the interven-
tion, etc. While incentivizing service delivery through these mechanisms, measures should 
be taken to assess quality—even if it complicates the process—as well as quantity. 
The targets for some of these indicators could evolve over the life of a project, starting at 
more modest levels and progressively reaching higher levels, including behavior change. 
One way of conceptualizing the process would be to define “results streams” and to set 
progressively more difficult disbursement linked indicators along the results chain for each 
stream. An example of such a results stream could be as follows.
• Year 1: Districts sign a performance agreement to implement a set of high-impact nutri-
tion interventions
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• Year 1.5: Community workers’ knowledge of appropriate infant and young child feeding 
(IYCF) practices
• Year 2: Availability (coverage) of community counseling services for IYCF
• Year 2.5: Caretakers’ knowledge of young children for IYCF practices
• Year 3: Appropriate IYCF practices, with increases in targets over subsequent periods
Service delivery indicators for PforR / DLI and PBB could include:  
• Districts included in a national social registry for targeting the poorest and most vul-
nerable households
• Districts implementing a nutrition sensitive social protection program 
• Districts, or other locally relevant subnational administrative units, with at least 80 
percent of community health workers / midwives trained to deliver a package of core 
nutrition services. A more ambitious indicator would incentivize the knowledge of 
workers, but that will be more difficult to assess. 
• Districts implementing a nutrition sensitive agriculture program
• Districts, or other subnational administrative units, where at least 80 percent of pri-
mary health centers offer community based nutrition counselling services
• Health facilities with all the inputs—human resources, equipment, supplies, as per 
checklist—required to provide comprehensive nutrition services to pregnant and 
lactating women and under-five children
• Districts, or other subnational administrative unit as appropriate, where more than 
90 percent of the population has access to safe water and sanitary facilities
• Women 15–49 years of age, and under-two children who have received a basic pack-
age of reproductive health and nutrition services
• Caretakers and influencers who demonstrate a minimum level of infant and young 
child feeding knowledge 
• Children 0–6 months who are exclusively breastfed
• Children at age six months receiving complementary food
 Health Facility Level
•  Performance Based Financing and Performance Based Contracting
In performance based financing, payment is made on the basis of the quantity and quality of 
pre-identified individual services provided. Rates paid for the achievement of each service 
are pre-established, so that the incentives are clear to providers, and can be adjusted over 
time. Quality checklists are used periodically as complementary tools and the performance 
on the quality review is a factor in the total payment. Payments are also often adjusted to 
account for the additional cost of operating in certain areas, e.g., remote areas of a country.  
When developing indicators to use in a PBF scheme, attention must be paid to ensuring 
that (i) the services selected have a clear operational definition that is easy to understand, 
e.g., what is the minimum content of the service; (ii) services are easily measurable; (iii) 
verifiers are able to extract the data on the service from registers or files; (iv) the name of 
an individual who received the services is identifiable so that the services can be verified 
and counter-verified; (v) services are provided on a regular basis so that health facilities can 
obtain payments regularly, i.e., at least quarterly; and (vi) not too many services are incentiv-
ized, i.e., a maximum of 25, due to the intensity of the verification and counter-verification. 
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Most of the experiences with PBF to date have been with services that fall under the 
responsibility of a health facility, i.e., services provided directly by facility workers or by 
community outreach workers that are accountable to a health facility. However, the PBF 
approach is increasingly being used to incentivize other levels of the system to ensure the 
alignment of incentives for effective service delivery.
Iron supplementation during pregnancy is one example of a nutrition service that could be 
incentivized with PBF. The quantity indicator could be the antenatal visits (first to fourth), 
which is a fairly standard indicator in PBF schemes, and which is when iron tablets and the 
related antenatal counseling should be provided. It may therefore be unnecessary to add a 
new quantity-related indicator. Alternatively, the indicator “pregnant women receiving a 
course of iron / folic acid tablets during ANC visits” may be used. In the quality checklist, the 
availability of iron tablets in the facility and the quality of counseling, tested by the knowl-
edge of the health worker, could be incentivized. At higher levels in the system, other critical 
elements could be incentivized—such as up-to-date policy and implementation guidance 
for iron supplementation, timely availability of supplies in the supply chain, and inclusion of 
information on iron supplementation in the community mobilization policy—either through 
a PBF approach or a PforR within the same project. Similar approaches could be devel-
oped for most of the core nutrition-specific nutrition interventions outlined in Table 1. Some 
of the interventions, e.g., promotion of exclusive breastfeeding, lend themselves better to 
incentivizing the delivery of messages (payment of information sessions) and beneficiary 
knowledge than the breastfeeding behavior because that behavior is difficult to verify.
Examples of quantitative nutrition indicators for a PBF approach include:
• Children 0–24 months who receive a predefined package of essential nutrition ser-
vices, meeting agreed quality standards / national protocol through a facility nutri-
tion visit
• Pregnant and lactating women who receive a predefined package of essential nutri-
tion services meeting agreed quality standards / national protocol through a facility 
visit; it could be the antenatal or child vaccination visit
• Pregnant and lactating women who receive iron / folic acid supplements
• Children 0–59 months with diarrhea receiving appropriate treatment with zinc and 
oral rehydration solution
• Children 6–59 months receiving vitamin A supplementation every six months
• Children 6–24 months receiving micronutrient powders to improve the quality of 
the diet
• Children receiving deworming treatment every six months
• Children 11–59 months old successfully treated for severe acute malnutrition
• Children 0–59 months receiving household visits for nutrition promotion, including 
nutrition counseling for the caregiver
• Households with pregnant women and / or under-five children visited by a health 
worker and provided outreach services including nutrition
Elements to consider in the PBF quality checklist for nutrition services include:
• Workers’ knowledge of key child feeding and caring behaviors
• Quality of counseling on child feeding and caring behaviors
• Availability of nutrition supplies, e.g., vitamin A, zinc, oral rehydration solution, iron 
/ folic acid supplements, micronutrient powders, etc.
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• Availability and quality of nutrition counseling behavior change materials, e.g., post-
ers, guides, videos, etc.
• Data on women and children in need of nutrition services in the target area
• Data on women and children currently being left out from nutrition services
• Micro plans for community outreach activities
When PBC is used, a wider list of nutrition indicators can be adopted because the verifi-
cation usually focuses on coverage of services and not on the payment of individual services, 
such as in PBF. Examples of nutrition indicators for a PBC approach include: 
• Children 0–24 months who receive a predefined package of essential nutrition ser-
vices, meeting agreed quality standards / national protocol would include counsel-
ling to caretakers on breastfeeding, complementary feeding, handwashing, etc. 
• Pregnant and lactating women who receive a predefined package of essential nutri-
tion services meeting agreed quality standards / national protocol
• Children 0–59 months with diarrhea receiving appropriate treatment with zinc and 
oral rehydration solution
• Children 6–59 months receiving vitamin A supplementation every six months
• Children receiving deworming treatment every six months
• Children 11–59 months old successfully treated for severe acute malnutrition
• Children 0–59 months receiving household visits for nutrition promotion, including 
nutrition counseling for the caregiver
• Households with pregnant women and / or under-five children visited by a health 
worker and provided outreach services including nutrition
• Children fully immunized 
 Community Level
•  Community-Based PBF and Community-Based Development (CDD)  
Programs
In community-based PBF and CDD programs, a main objective is to incentivize results that 
specifically require either community mobilization or collective action to create an envi-
ronment that enables positive nutrition change to occur. There is a difference, however, 
between community-based PBF and CDD programs. Community-based PBF involves con-
tracting with a community platform to achieve nutrition results, and payments are linked 
to the achievement of these pre-identified results. CDD programs aim to achieve similar re-
sults, but payments are not typically linked to these results. Because CDD payments are not 
linked to results, verification is less of a constraint and thus a somewhat wider range of nu-
trition indicators may be used. However, CDD programs tend to be more “bottom-up” than 
community-based BPF, which enhances ownership but poses an additional challenge that 
malnutrition is not always recognized as a priority by the community. Some of the determi-
nants of malnutrition, e.g., access to water and sanitation, access to health and education 
services, improved agricultural practices, tend to emerge as community priorities, but not 
with specific nutrition objectives which the evidence demonstrates are critical to achieving 
nutritional impact.
Both community-based approaches could involve improvements in the physical environ-
ment, such as removal of physical barriers to accessing services, e.g., by building a small 
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bridge to cross a river. It could also involve changing community norms that create barriers 
to certain behaviors, such as norms surrounding the role that men should or should not play 
in infant and young child feeding.  
Collective action could also be incentivized, such as community mapping of malnutrition 
and positive deviance approaches, whereby lessons learned from households with lower or 
no malnutrition are applied to support households with high levels of malnutrition in the 
same community.  
Some nutrition products and services that are typically provided in facilities, e.g., zinc 
and oral rehydration solution for treatment of diarrhea, and services to treat cases of severe 
acute malnutrition without complications, can be provided in community settings. Such 
community-based services may be particularly useful in communities that are either isolat-
ed geographically or excluded socially, and consequently have less access to health facilities. 
As noted above, one challenge with community-based approaches is that communities 
do not always identify malnutrition as a problem, and therefore, they may not know which 
specific actions to take to address it. In this case, the choice of indicators is all the more 
important because well-chosen indicators will focus the attention of community members 
on improvements. The choice of priority indicators will vary by community and should be 
based on an analysis of the determinants of malnutrition in the community—or at least at 
the next highest administrative level, for example at the district level, where data is more 
likely to be available. Some Bank operations have developed tools to facilitate the analysis of 
determinants of malnutrition at the community level, such as in Nepal. Operations may also 
need to build in a network of technical advisors in CDD operations to “coach” communities 
in making their projects more nutrition-sensitive. 
Indicators that could be used in community-based PBF and CDD programs include:
• Community growth charts, accompanied by information on determinants of malnu-
trition, displayed at a prominent place in the community and updated regularly
• Positive deviance mapping and related action plans produced
• Children under-five suffering from severe acute malnutrition who are referred by the 
community to an appropriate health facility for management
• Children under-five identified as suffering from severe acute malnutrition who are 
successfully treated through community-based approaches
• Households which have sanitary toilet facilities and safe water supply
• Community members who do not practice open defecation
• Community plan to address food insecurity
• Households using adequately iodized salt for routine consumption
• Pregnant women / mothers of under-five children with the correct knowledge of 
pre-identified minimum, nutrition-related behaviors. Same indicator for men and 
for grandmothers
• Sufficient quantities of zinc and oral rehydration solution available to treat all cases 
of diarrhea in children under-five
• Pregnant and lactating women consuming iron supplements
• Quality checklists (similar to facility level)—applied to community-based events, in-
cluding testing the quality of the messages
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 Household / Individual Level
•  Cash Transfer Programs / Public Works Programs
Cash transfer programs and public works programs each have their respective “core indica-
tors” to measure the performance of their basic objectives, which is to protect poor house-
holds from shock and to ensure a minimum income. The income itself can have a positive 
impact on the consumption of nutritious foods, e.g., micronutrient-rich foods, or on the uti-
lization of health and education services. These outcomes should be tracked.  
Nutrition objectives can be further incentivized through cash transfer and public works 
programs, for example, by linking the cash transfers—through conditions or information 
packages—to the utilization of proven nutrition services (see list in Table 1). Since cash 
transfer programs are increasingly using softer conditions, i.e., less use of hard conditions 
that are difficult and costly to verify, the verifiability of indicators is less of a challenge than 
for performance based financing. It is therefore possible to incentivize results further up the 
chain of worker knowledge • caretaker / beneficiary knowledge • caretaker / beneficiary 
behavior • nutritional impact. This is an important feature because few of the incentive 
mechanisms reviewed in this study have the ability to reach as far up the results chain.
Public work programs provide additional income and increasing, skills training and other 
related services, e.g., savings. The more innovative programs also ensure that women can do 
work that is less strenuous; thereby decreasing the risk of further reducing their already low 
body mass index (BMI). Training programs for the beneficiaries should focus on some nutri-
tion-sensitive areas, such as small-scale food processing and fortification. The choice works 
to be constructed through public works programs can also be nutrition-sensitive. Indicators 
that could incentivize nutrition results include:
• Pregnant women who attend antenatal clinics regularly—at least four times during 
pregnancy
• Consumption of iron supplements by women during pregnancy
• BMI of women during pregnancy
• Children fully immunized
• Women and children sleeping under insecticide-treated bednets to prevent malaria
• Household food consumption profile, by gender and age
• Rate of school completion for adolescent girls
• Mothers who report early and exclusive breastfeeding
• Mothers who report appropriate complementary feeding behaviors
• Mothers who participate regularly in nutrition promotion sessions 
• Children who receive appropriate oral rehydration therapy and zinc for treatment of 
diarrhea
• Children under-five who consume adequate quantities of multiple micronutrient 
powders along with their regular diet
• Availability of crèches as part of public work programs
• Nutrition-sensitive community infrastructure constructed
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Landscape of Nutrition Partners  
Working on Nutrition
Given the magnitude and complexity of the nutrition challenge, working in a cohesive and com-
plementary manner with development partners is critical. When developing a nutrition-sensi-
tive World Bank operation, an important step will be to undertake a mapping of partners and 
their priorities, and their areas of support. If the country has joined the Scaling Up Nutrition 
(SUN) movement, such a mapping may already exist, and the partners should already be orga-
nized into the following networks: donors, UN agencies, business, and civil society. See www.
scalingupnutrition.org. When mapping nutrition partners, the following types of partners 
should be considered.
• Bilateral Donors: Some bilateral donors have prioritized nutrition for decades, where-
as others have discovered it more recently. Donors are active in policy dialogue at the global 
level and through their bilateral relationships, e.g., through embassies in countries. They 
are also a source of financing for nutrition, either through their bilateral agreements with 
governments, through their contributions to multilateral agencies, or through direct agree-
ments with implementation agencies such as nongovernmental organizations. They have 
traditionally distinguished between nutrition as part of an emergency response and human-
itarian assistance or as part of addressing the long-term aspects of malnutrition—notably 
stunting and micronutrient deficiencies. Some donors have separate divisions responsible 
for each part of their programming areas. Increasingly, these two types of assistance are 
merging into a continuum. Some of the donors have a stronger interest in financing nutri-
tion-specific interventions, whereas others have chosen to build on their preexisting priori-
ty areas, such as agriculture, and to make those investments more nutrition-sensitive.  
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• Multilateral institutions: A range of multilateral institutions are active partners 
in nutrition. All are active in the policy arena—nationally and globally—while also a source 
of financing at the country level. Some specialize in certain aspects of nutrition, e.g., mater-
nal and child nutrition, food security, safety net programs, etc., whereas others bring to the 
table the ability to work in a wide range of sectors.  
• Foundations: In recent years, a number of international and national foundations have 
made nutrition a priority. Particularly the larger foundations can play a role similar to bilat-
eral donors, i.e., a combination of policy advocacy and direct project financing. Some foun-
dations have been created by companies to support non-commercial work 
and can be an entry point for collaboration with the private sector. 
•  Civil Society: A wide range of civil society organizations are active 
players in nutrition. These include:
• International and national nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 
Some NGOs specialize in certain aspects of nutrition, whereas others 
are generalists. Some of the international NGOs are active in interna-
tional policy advocacy as well as in direct program implementation. In 
some cases, international NGOs play a technical advisory role to na-
tional NGOs on nutrition issues. National NGOs working in nutrition 
are numerous and varied. They play an advocacy role and implement 
programs directly. NGOs are at times the implementers of contracts 
from governments, e.g., performance based contracting.  
• Media. Media personalities are opinion leaders that play an important 
role in raising the overall profile of nutrition and clarifying some of 
the specific issues. Some media partners are also involved in behavior 
change communication, either through groups dedicated to the sub-
ject, e.g., media foundations that specialize in behavior change in de-
veloping countries, or as contracted implementers of behavior change 
communication activities. In a country where nutrition is not a high 
priority or where it is misunderstood, it may be wise to proactively en-
gage with the media to develop their capacity to engage on the issue. 
• Religious leaders. In many countries where malnutrition is highly 
prevalent, religious leaders are opinion leaders, and they can be effec-
tive agents either in an advocacy campaign or for individual behavior 
change. Some religious groups also manage organizations that offer 
nutrition services to the population. These same organizations are 
also a potentially important source of financing for nutrition in some 
countries. 
• Academia / think tanks. Some research groups and think tanks have 
focused specifically on nutrition and are important partners in areas 
such as advocacy and evidence generation for nutrition. A range of 
national and international universities are key players, with roles that 
range from preservice training of nutrition workers to impact evalu-
ation and other types of research. Some academics in countries are 
important opinion leaders due to their deep technical knowledge on 
nutrition. 
• Private sector: The private sector plays a critical role in nutrition. They produce and 
process food, provide a high proportion of the health services in developing countries and 
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malnutrition, vitamin and mineral supplements, and nutrition assessment tools. 
The private sector also tends to have a comparative advantage in deploying logis-
tics systems in areas that are difficult to reach, which is a particular challenge for 
enabling the poorest and most vulnerable to access nutrition services. Assessing 
the private sector’s level of engagement in a country will be a critical aspect of the 
partner mapping. A good starting point is usually national federations or associa-
tions that represent private sector entities. Equally important will be to assess the 
government capacity to engage with the private sector, notably in the area of reg-
ulation to balance the private sector’s incentive to provide value to shareholders 
with the public interest in reducing malnutrition. 
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Additional Support to Task Teams  
and Leaders to Incentivize Nutrition 
Programming
A number of other resources are available at the World Bank to support task team in scaling up 
nutrition, including:
• Experienced staff: A group of World Bank staff who have technical knowledge and 
experience in integrating nutrition into national policies and programs. This group op-
erates as a community of practice and is one of the Global Solutions Groups within the 
Health, Nutrition and Population Global Practice, under the leadership of the Global Solu-
tions Lead, Meera Shekar (mshekar@worldbank.org). They can be integrated into World 
Bank task teams to support policy dialogue and operations.
• SWAT team: The staff in the Global Solutions Group for nutrition and short-term consul-
tants are available for rapid mobilization as part of the World Bank’s response to country 
requests for technical assistance in policy reform, program design, implementation sup-
port evaluation, etc. 
• Reference materials: A number of technical guidance notes and other reference 
materials are available to guide teams. See Annex 2.
• Trust Funds: A number of trust funds are available to support country teams in scaling 
up nutrition, including:
• Japan Trust Fund
• Power of Nutrition Trust Fund
• Global Financing Facility (GFF) Trust Fund for Every Woman Every Child
• Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) Trust Fund
• Strategic Impact Evaluation Fund (SIEF) Trust Fund
• Rapid Social Response (SRS) Trust Fund
• Early Learning Partnership
• Additional support: Several donors and partners are in discussion with the World 
Bank to see how they can best support the institution to scale up its financing of operations 
to prevent stunting. 

Annexes
ANNEX 1  The Nutrition System
What are the main elements of a national nutrition system?
Countries successfully managing national nutrition programs share common governance struc-
tures, systems, and determinants—even if the political, cultural, and economic contexts for each 
country’s nutrition problems and solutions differ. Based on a recent systematic literature review 
of nutrition governance and policy processes, we outline the structures and factors that affect how 
the World Bank and its clients are solving their distinct undernutrition situations. This review13 
highlights the critical components, challenges, and enabling factors that characterize countries 
with successful nutrition programs, which are alleviating undernutrition in their populations. 
A country’s enabling environment is a critical backdrop to scale up effective national nutri-
tion programs. The 2013 Lancet series on maternal and child nutrition defines an enabling en-
vironment as “political and policy processes that build and sustain momentum for the effective 
implementation of actions that reduce undernutrition.”14  The 2015 Global Nutrition Report15 
identifies a series of actions in three domains that are required to create an enabling environment 
ultimately leading to actions to improve nutritional status. These are (1) governance and political 
economy; (2) capacity and resources; and (3) framing and evidence (see Figure 1). Each domain 
is described below.
13 S. Gillespie et al. 2013 The Lancet Maternal and Child Nutrition 4. The politics of reducing malnutrition: building commit-
ment and accelerating progress. 82–99.
14 Ibid.
15 International Food Policy Research Institute. 2015. Global Nutrition Report (GNR) 2015 Actions and Accountability to Ad-
vance Nutrition and Sustainable Development. Washington, DC.
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Figure 1. Structural Elements to Achieve Nutritional Impact at Scale
 
Source: Adapted from the Global Nutrition Report 2015.
1. Governance and Political Economy
Cross-sectoral governance structures
A high-level, cross-sectoral governance structure(s) is needed at the national level to coordinate 
nutrition programing, e.g., a nutrition focal point located in the Prime Minister’s office. This 
structure is charged with and accountable for coordinating an integrated nutrition policy and 
a proven set of programs to reduce undernutrition. In addition to a high level nutrition coordi-
nating structure, platforms for cross-sector and multi-stakeholder actions need to be established 
to support nutrition programming. The Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) global movement supports 
countries in establishing multi-stakeholder platforms (MSP) as an important first step in scaling 
up nutrition at the national level.  
Nutrition policies and legislation
A national nutrition strategy and policies are also necessary to guide the process of improving the 
environment contributing to poor nutrition. A recent review16 of scaled up nutrition programs 
found that national nutrition policies frequently lack a number of components critical for suc-
cess. These are planning for well-designed evidence-based nutrition interventions; clear goals, 
targets, and timelines for desired nutrition outcomes and impacts; attention to capacity building 
at all levels; monitoring and evaluation; and a financing plan.
Improved governance through legislation for nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive ac-
tivities and commodities is also central to achieving effective nutrition programs. For example, 
governments need to institute laws and standards to govern food fortification, legislation to im-
16 S. Gillespie et al. 2015. Advances in Nutrition 6. Scaling Up Impact on Nutrition: What Will it Take? 440–51. 
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plement the Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes, food safety standards, maternity leave, 
and regulations regarding the marketing of foods to children—among other issues that require 
good governance. 
Accountability mechanisms
Government accountability to its citizens is reinforced by international commitment. “Account-
ability is the glue that connects commitment to action,” according to the 2015 Global Nutrition 
Report.17 International accountability mechanisms include the six 2025 World Health Assembly 
(WHA) nutrition targets and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The international com-
munity has committed to a series of important nutrition targets by 2030. SDG 2.2 calls for an end 
to all forms of malnutrition, including achieving by 2025 the internationally agreed targets on 
stunting and wasting in children under-five years of age and addressing the nutritional needs of 
adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women, and older persons.18 Countries need to develop 
and disseminate specific commitments and targets for nutrition, e.g., reducing child stunting, 
coverage of children with vitamin A supplements, and the early initiation of breastfeeding.
Tracking and reporting the accomplishments of national nutrition commitments are import-
ant next steps. A variety of reporting mechanisms exist at the global level and can be adapted to 
individual country contexts. In 2015, for example, WHO member states ad-
opted a Global Monitoring Framework on Maternal, Infant and Young Child 
Nutrition with 14 nutrition related indicators, in addition to the six WHA 
nutrition targets.19 
Checklists and scorecards to track nutrition commitments can be used at 
multiple levels within a country, starting at the community and moving to 
district, regional, and national levels. Social audits and public hearings at the 
local levels help to raise awareness, create demand on the part of families, 
and mobilize the commitment of communities to invest resources in the 
damaging but often invisible problem of undernutrition. Another important 
accountability mechanism is engaging the media to highlight progress or 
challenges.  
The private sector
The private sector plays a major role in a nation’s food system(s) and direct-
ly affects the nutrition status of its citizens. Ranging from food production 
and processing to food distribution and retail, the private sector is a major 
player in the business of feeding a population. In addition, through the pri-
vate sector’s participation in the health sector, the media, and the technology 
sector—including mobile phones to provide nutrition and health information 
to consumers as well as data collection for monitoring and evaluation purposes, the private sec-
tor is an influential partner in producing better or worse nutrition for vulnerable groups such as 
children and pregnant women. 
The potential for conflict of interest is significant between the private sector’s primary goal 
of increasing value for investors and shareholders and optimal public health and nutrition out-
comes. Aggressive marketing of breastmilk substitutes is a classic example. So is the production 
and marketing of sugary beverages and high fat and salty snack foods, which contribute to over-
weight, obesity, and the rise of chronic diseases such as diabetes.
17 International Food Policy Research Institute. 2015. 
18 United Nations. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E.
19 WHO indicators. http://www.who.int/nutrition/events/2015_informal_consultation_monitoringframework_miycn_back-
groundpaper_indicators.pdf. 
Accountability 





How can the private sector be incentivized to meet the nutritional needs of the lower income 
quintiles by developing low-cost fortified complementary foods and affordable multiple micro-
nutrient supplements for pregnant women, for example, while also holding the private sector 
accountable for positive nutrition outcomes? Governments, international organizations, and civil 
society can work together to meet this challenge through a variety of mechanisms, including 
regulatory, political, and market-based mechanisms.20 Transparency is a critical attribute of pub-
lic-private sector engagements, including clarifying how policies that affect the nutrition of vul-
nerable groups are affected by private sector influence. 
Accountability mechanisms for engaging with the private sector can include direct imposition 
of food safety laws and production standards, taxes and subsidies, and public praise or criticism 
of industry and businesses by politicians or others. Consumer watchdog groups, shareholder ac-
tions at annual company meetings, and consumer boycotts are ways that civil society can hold the 
private sector accountable to positively affecting nutrition.21 
2. Capacity and Resources
Nutrition leaders and champions
Focused leadership and national and international champions for nutrition are critical for suc-
cess in nutrition programs and approaches.22 23  Strategic, experienced senior leaders, particularly 
within government, are critical to mobilize others across sectoral boundaries and to build ef-
fective teams and partnerships to collaboratively address complex undernutrition issues and to 
manage competing stakeholders’ interests at all levels of the nutrition and food system.24
Common challenges for nutrition leaders include working effectively with ministries, donors, 
and other stakeholders, scarce data, understanding local level contexts and scenarios of undernu-
trition, as well as the lack of coherent country policies, goals, and programs. Even when political 
rhetoric supports nutrition, the ability to hold politicians and bureaucrats accountable to nutri-
tion commitments is frequently difficult. 
Possible approaches to build the capacity of leaders in nutrition include (1) coaching and other 
techniques to increase adult development, which require a substantial investment of time, and 
(2) training programs to impart technical nutrition knowledge and skills in stakeholder mapping, 
advocacy, and transforming evidence to policy reform and action, among other trainings that 
are generally shorter in duration. Proactive planning for and investment in developing nutrition 
leaders is crucial to improving nutrition outcomes in high burden countries.
Frontline workers at sufficient capacity 
The technical capacity and motivation of frontline workers is critical to delivering quality nutri-
tion services. Accurate nutrition knowledge and training in applied skills is necessary, e.g., mea-
surement of children and effective counseling techniques for all cadres and levels of health care 
staff from physicians and nurses to community health workers and village volunteers. Staffing 
and coverage of rural and remote health facility settings is often problematic, and the high turn-
over of paid and volunteer health workers is a challenge to adequate human capacity nutrition 
staffing for many countries.
Incentives to encourage and retain nutrition workers—particularly frontline workers—can take 
different forms. Financial rewards are one type of incentive, but others may also be effective, 
20 International Food Policy Research Institute. 2015. 
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 N. Nisbett et al. 2015. Food Policy 53. What drives and constrains effective leadership in tackling child undernutrition? Find-
ings from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India and Kenya. 33–45.
24 Ibid. 
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including peer recognition, the opportunity for additional training or study, performance-linked 
rewards such as local community-based award ceremonies, competitions between service areas, 
and job promotions.25
Implementation at district and community level 
A functioning decentralized administrative governance structure is key to the effective deliv-
ery of nutrition services at the district and community levels. A six-country governance study 26 
found that the following attributes of sub-national governance are helpful for moving nutrition 
policy successfully into action. They are (1) capacity to effectively implement nutrition services at 
the local level; (2) politicians and local leaders at district and community levels who understand 
and support the importance of addressing nutrition issues, which are also supported by decen-
tralized budgets and an understanding of the potential political salience of malnutrition; and (3) 
timely and accurate data about the undernutrition situation. 
Supply and logistics systems
An effective and efficient supply system is required to source and deliver the commodities that 
support nutrition programming. Supplies include micronutrient supplements, e.g., vitamin A 
capsules, micronutrient powders, oral rehydration salts and zinc tablets, therapeutic food for 
malnourished children, supplementary food, scales and other monitoring and measurement 
equipment, among other necessary supplies.
Supply chain planning depends on the careful assessment of need, including determining the 
number of beneficiaries that require which type(s) of commodities; the duration of need; the dis-
tance or methods of commodity transport, etc.; and a functioning information system to manage 
the process from planning through procurement, transportation, storage and delivery to bene-
ficiaries. Determining the shelf life of commodities must be part of the planning, including the 
risk of food-borne illness, e.g., for supplementary foods. A quality assurance system must also be 
established for product sampling and testing, for example. 
New technologies, such as Rapid SMS, are providing innovative ways to monitor supply chain 
logistics. By sending mobile text message data, with real-time reports on the distribution of nu-
trition commodities, staff can report stock-outs at local health clinics to central warehouses so 
supplies can be transported immediately, instead of weeks or months later.
Financing
Sustainable and effective nutrition programming requires predictable funding from a combina-
tion of domestic, international, donor, and public and private sectors. To determine the financing 
requirements and gaps for national nutrition programs, a costing exercise is a necessary first step 
in the planning process. Several different costing approaches and tools have been used. More 
than 20 Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) countries have prepared costed nutrition plans using sev-
eral approaches. The program unit cost approach is based on estimates of the cost per child of a 
program in similar countries, such as a program for the community management of severe acute 
malnutrition. The ingredients approach breaks down activities into their components and costs 
them individually. Although the ingredients approach is considered the more precise, it is also 
the more resource-intensive approach to costing a program.
3. Framing and evidence
Narratives that create compelling argument for change
Generating political will is necessary to build and sustain the interest and momentum necessary 
25 S. Gillespie, et al. 2015. Advances in Nutrition 6. Scaling Up Impact on Nutrition: What Will it Take? 440–51.  
26 A.M. Acosta and Fanzo, J.. 2012. Fighting maternal and child malnutrition: analyzing the political and institutional determinants 
of delivering a national multisectoral response in six countries. A synthesis paper. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
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for successful national nutrition policies. The experiences of Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia, India, 
Peru, and Zambia demonstrate the importance of insuring that nutrition is framed as part of the 
broader national development agenda to raise nutrition to a higher public profile.27 Raising na-
tional awareness about the critical 1,000 day window to prevent irreparable damage to a child’s 
cognitive and physical development links nutrition programming directly to a nation’s human 
capital and development goals.
Peru and Brazil have elevated nutrition to the national agenda. In Peru, nutrition became a 
centerpiece of the government’s engagement with its citizens with a presidential promise to re-
duce stunting by 5 percent for all children under five in five years, known as the “5 by 5 by 5” 
commitment. Brazil framed its drive to improve nutrition as part of the government’s program 
to alleviate poverty and hunger—raising the issue of nutrition from a narrow 
health sector concern to one of broad and national importance. 
Information systems with data and metrics for monitoring nutrition
For accountability mechanisms to be effective, accurate data must be avail-
able to track, analyze, and report the results of interventions and programs 
designed to reduce undernutrition. Governments need to collect compara-
ble data systematically with consistent frequency, coverage, and quality over 
time. Persistent gaps exist in data about infants and young children’s diets 
and the heights and weights for women of reproductive age across coun-
tries—as well as many other information gaps for individual countries.28 
The traditional nationally representative household surveys such as the 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) or UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator 
Cluster Surveys (MICS) can be complemented by less expensive survey 
methods. For example, the Helen Keller International post-event coverage 
surveys (PECS) require smaller samples and can be implemented annually. 
Mobile phones can also be used for rapid data collection, which may be use-
ful to expand nutrition surveillance and increase the availability and use of 
quality nutrition data. 
The European Union and the Scaling Up Nutrition movement are leading 
the National Information Platforms for Nutrition initiative (NIPN). It aims to 
be a country-led and owned approach to support the collection of comparable 
information about nutrition outcomes and resources and programs supportive 
of improved nutrition. The NIPN’s intended goals are better donor coordina-
tion, strengthened nutrition strategies and program planning, and a fuller un-
derstanding of the contributions of nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive 
actions delivered through multiple sectors.
What is needed to scale up an effective response?
With a solid evidence base to guide the selection of nutrition-specific inter-
ventions, countries must prioritize national scale up of programs that effec-
tively and efficiently deliver quality nutrition services. As nutrition-sensitive approaches to im-
proved nutrition are tested and evaluated for delivery through agriculture, social protection, and 
education, they will also need to be scaled up. The following key elements critical to scaling up 
nutrition programs based on the research by Gillespie29 are as follows: 
• A clear vision of the type of large-scale nutrition impact that is envisioned, along with met-
rics and a persuasive story line to explain how and why this impact will be achieved.
27Ibid.
28 International Food Policy Research Institute. 2015. 
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• Clarity about the specific interventions / approaches that will be scaled up, e.g., nutri-
tion-specific, nutrition-sensitive, and the context, e.g., household and community settings, 
stand-alone project or integrated into the national health system, etc., in which the scale 
up will occur.
• High-level political support, including a nutrition leader / champion; national and local lev-
el commitment to resolving nutrition problems and incentives for achieving tangible results.
• Planning for what will be scaled up and how. Scaling up processes may take the form of 
quantitative scale up (expansion in size, geographical reach or budget); functional scale 
up (increased types / numbers of activities); political scale up (growing through political 
support); and organizational scale up marked by increased strength and capacity of the 
organization.
•  Adequate capacity to go to scale, including strong organizations and sys-
tems that will support / empower the workforce needed to achieve the 
nutrition objectives of the program / strategy. In addition, the strategic ca-
pacity of leaders and managers, e.g., skills for building commitment, con-
flict resolution, and strategic communication among others, and the op-
erational capacity of both management and the workforce are important.
•  Within governance, there is a need for horizontal (the systems / structures 
supporting cross-sectoral engagement on nutrition) and vertical (national 
to community-level systems and structures) coherence as well as the reso-
lution of trade-offs for such issues as tension between community owner-
ship of small-scale programs and large scale implementation, quantity ver-
sus quality in the process of scaling up, and short-term versus longer-term 
impacts.
•  To finance scale up of nutrition programs, funding needs to be adequate, 
stable, and flexible to support adaptation of the scale up process as need-
ed, including responding to local needs and learning.30  
•  Monitoring, learning, and adapting midcourse, and evaluation of pro-
gram impacts are all important components of the process of going to 
scale.
How to coordinate an effective multisectoral response?
A comprehensive approach to reducing malnutrition will require actions at all 
levels of a country’s health system, across a number of key sectors, and focused 
on supply and demand. The health sector policy-making and service delivery 
systems—the traditional “home” of nutrition interventions—will likely con-
tinue to be a main platform to address the immediate causes of malnutrition 
through direct nutrition interventions. Nevertheless, several nutrition-spe-
cific interventions can at least be partly delivered through other sectors. Ad-
dressing the underlying causes of malnutrition through nutrition-sensitive 
interventions will also require actions from other key sectors, notably educa-
tion, social protection, agriculture, gender, and water and sanitation.  
30 Estimating the cost of scaling up nutrition programs remains challenging for several reasons. Detailed costing studies for 
specific contexts are often unavailable, although there are several groups, including the World Bank, that are working with 
countries to correct this. More is known about the costs for delivering nutrition-specific interventions; whereas much less in-
formation is available about the costs of nutrition-sensitive approaches to undernutrition. Similarly, there is little information 
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A multisectoral nutrition response is complex and requires a strong coordinating mech-
anism at the national level, but usually also at other levels of the system. In federated 
states, coordination mechanisms are also necessary at the provincial and state level, and 
in all countries, usually also at a district level or its equivalent. Given the complexity of 
the undertaking, a successful model may follow the following steps: 
Plan multisectorally • implement sectorally • 
review progress regularly multisectorally.
While multisectoral coordination is required at the planning and review stages, the sec-
tors will implement independently. Such a model is probably more realistic than attempt-
ing to have all the sectors implementing jointly at all times in a given geography. However, 
the model is workable only if the relevant ministries are incentivized to meet together 
to plan the program and to re-meet to review progress and to take corrective actions as 
necessary.
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REGION COUNTRY PROJECT NUMBER PROJECT TITLE TASK TEAM LEADER
AFR Benin P143652 Food, Health and Nutrition Project
Mulder-Sibanda, 
Menno
AFR Burkina Faso P124015 Social Safety Net project
Monchuk,  
Louise Victoria




P149512 Emergency Food crisis & Agriculture relaunch Ehoue, Bleoue Nicaise
AFR Chad P148052
Mother and Child Health Re-
sults Strengthening Project
Diack, Aissatou
AFR Chad P151215 Emergency Food and Livestock Crisis Response Hopkins, Jane C.




P147555 Health System Strengthening Project
Samaha,  
Hadia Nazem
AFR Congo, Republic P143849 Health Sector Project
Fritsche,  
Gyorgy Bela
AFR Cote d'Ivoire P147740
Health Systems Strengthen-
ing & Ebola Preparedness
Haazen, Dominic S.
AFR Cote d'Ivoire P119328 Emergency Basic Education Support Project
Kamil, Hamoud 
Abdel Wedoud
AFR Djibouti P131194 Improving Health Sector Performance Ozaltin, Emre
AFR Ethiopia P146883 Productive Safety Nets Project 4 Coll-Black, Sarah
AFR Ethiopia P148591 Second Agricultural Growth Project Goodland, Andrew D.
AFR Gambia, The P143650 Maternal & Child Nutrition & Health Results Hasan, Rifat
AFR Ghana P145792 Maternal, Child Health & Nutrition
Akala, Francis-
ca Ayodeji
AFR Ghana P105092 Nutrition and Malaria Control for Child Survival Awittor, Evelyn
AFR Guinea P147758 Primary Health Services Improvement Magazi, Ibrahim
AFR Guinea P123900 Productive Social Safety Net Project Zampaglione, Giuseppe
AFR Kenya P148098 Kenya Health Sector Support Project
Ramana,  
Gandham N.V. 




Emergency Support to Critical Ed-
ucation, Health, Nutrition
Qamruddin, Jumana N.
AFR Madagascar P149323 Social Safety Net Project Vermehren, Andrea
AFR Malawi P125237 Nutrition & HIV/AIDS Project Hyder, Ziauddin
AFR Malawi P105256
Agricultural Development  Pro-
gram Support Project
Durand, Olivier
AFR Malawi P133620 Strengthening Safety Nets System Drabek, Ivan
AFR Malawi P154803 Malawi Floods ERL Parvez, Ayaz
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REGION COUNTRY PROJECT NUMBER PROJECT TITLE TASK TEAM LEADER
AFR Mali P127328 Emergency Safety Nets project
Pereira Guimaraes 
Leite, Phillippe George
AFR Mozambique P151407 Third Agriculture Development Policy Operation Nijhoff, Jan Joost
AFR Niger P147638 Population and Health Support Project Karamoko, Djibrilla
AFR Niger P132405 Support to Quality Education Project Majgaard, Kirsten
AFR Niger P123399 Niger Safety Net Project Del Ninno, Carlo
AFR Nigeria P146583 Saving One Million Lives
Loevinsohn,  
Benjamin P.
AFR Nigeria P120798 Nigeria States Health Investment Project
Odutolu,  
Ayodeji Oluwole 
AFR Senegal P129472 Health & Nutrition Financing Lemiere, Christophe
AFR Senegal P070541 Senegal Nutrition Enhancement Program Mulder-Sibanda, Menno
AFR Senegal P115938
Rapid Response Child-Focused Social Cash 
Transfer and Nutrition Security Project
Mulder-Sibanda, Menno
AFR Senegal P133597 Senegal Safety Net Coudouel, Aline
AFR South Sudan P127187 South Sudan Health Rapid Results Project Chisaka, Noel
AFR Tanzania P152736 Strengthening PHC for Results Nguyen, Son Nam
AFR Togo P143843 Maternal and Child Health Support
Ousmane  
Diadie, Haidara
AFR Togo P127200 Community Development and Safety Nets Van Dyck, John
AFR Togo P144484 Pilot Cash Transfer Program Van Dyck, John
AFR Uganda P143324 Enhance Smallholder Family Nutrition Hyder, Ziauddin
AFR Uganda P149286 Multisectoral Food Security Nutrition Hyder, Ziauddin
AFR Zambia P145335 Health Services Improvement Project
Workie, Net-
sanet Walelign
AFR Zambia P147745 Livelihood & Nutrition Project Hyder, Ziauddin
EAP Cambodia P132751 SP Cash Transfer Pilot Project Acosta, Pablo Ariel
EAP Indonesia P128832 PNPM RURAL 2012-2015 Woo, Sonya















P123891 Mobilizing Ethnic Communities for Imp Ishihara, Satoshi
EAP Timor-Leste P145491 Community Driven Nutrition Improvement Sullivan, Eileen Brainne
EAP Vietnam P152023 Northern Mountain Child Nutrition Dao, Huong Lan
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REGION COUNTRY PROJECT NUMBER PROJECT TITLE TASK TEAM LEADER
EAP Vietnam P128072 VN-Central Highlands Poverty Reduction Bradley, Sean
ECA Tajikistan P146109 Tajikistan JSDF Nutrition Grant 2 Lavado, Rouselle F.
LCR Brazil P101504 Second Bolsa Família
Steta Gandara,  
Maria Concepcion
LCR El Salvador P117157 Strengthening Public Health Care System
Gordillo-Tobar, 
Amparo Elena
LCR Haiti P123706 HT Improving Maternal and Child Health Rajkumar, Andrew Sunil
LCR Guatemala P077756 Maternal and Infant Health and Nutrition Lao Pen, Christine
LCR Nicaragua P106870 Community and Family Health Care Services
Gordillo-Tobar, 
Amparo Elena
LCR Haiti P126744 Relaunching Agriculture: RESEPAG II Colleye, Pierre Olivier
LCR Honduras P148737 Corredor Seco Food Security Project Weiss, Eli
LCR Nicaragua P148809 Caribbean Coast Food Security Project Garcia, Augusto
LCR Peru P079165 Sierra Rural Development Project Diaz Rios, Luz Berania
LCR Haiti P124134  Education for All Project - Phase II Baron, Juan
LCR Guatemala P145410 Pilot  Improve the Dev and Nutrition Bassett, Lucy Katherine
LCR Peru P117310 Results Nutrition for Juntos SWAp Marini, Alessandra
LCR Peru P131029 Social Inclusion TAL
Silva Villalobos, Carmen 
Veronica Del Rosar
MNA Djibouti P130328 Crisis Response-SSN project
Koettl-Brodmann,  
Stefanie
MNA Yemen, Republic of P094755 Health & Population
Abdel-Hamid, Alaa 
Mahmoud Hamed
MNA Yemen, Republic of P131236 Emergency Targeted  Nutrition Intervention
Abdel-Hamid, Alaa 
Mahmoud Hamed
SAR Afghanistan P129663 System Enhancement for Health (SEHAT) Sayed, Ghulam Dastagir
SAR Afghanistan P112446
Strengthening Health Activities 
for the Rural Poor (SHARP)
ul Haq, Inaam
SAR Bangladesh P009496 Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition Project Gragnolati, Michele
SAR Bangladesh P118708 Health Sector Development Program Alam, Bushra Binte
SAR Bangladesh P074841
Health Nutrition and Popula-
tion Sector Program
Binte Alam, Bushra
SAR Bangladesh P120583 Modern Grain Storage Facilities Verissimo, Patrick
SAR Bangladesh P123457 Integrated Agricultural Productivity Cook, Edward C.
SAR Bangladesh P149605 Nuton Jibon Livelihood Improvement Project Manoharan, Seenithamby
SAR Bangladesh P146520 Income Support Program for the Poorest
Malik,  
Muhammad Iftikhar
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SAR India P121731 IN: ICDS Syst Strength & Nut Imp Program Pinto, Sangeeta Carol
SAR India P149811 Karnataka Multisectoral Nutrition Pilot Al-Omair, Abeyah A.
SAR India P143608 Telangana Rural Inclusive Growth Pr Shah, Parmesh
SAR India P152210 Andhra Pradesh Rural Inclusive Growth Pr Shah, Parmesh
SAR India P102627 Bihar PRI Nagarajan, Mohan
SAR Nepal P125359 Community Action for Nutrition Project Bhattarai, Manav
SAR Nepal P128905 Agriculture and Food Security Project
Mghenyi, Elliot 
Wamboka
SAR Pakistan P123394 Punjab Health Sector Reform Project Masud, Tayyeb
SAR Pakistan P131850 Enhanced Nutrition for Mothers and Child Kaufmann, Silvia
SAR Pakistan P128307 Sindh Agricultural Growth Project Syed, Tahira
SAR Pakistan P150974 Improving Nutrition at Local Level
Alvi, Mohammad  
Imtiaz Akhtar




TERM DEFINITION (adapted from World Bank. 2013. Improving Nutrition Through 
Multisectoral Approaches. Washington, DC: World Bank.)  
First 1,000 days The period of time, or window of opportunity, from conception to 2 years old, in 
which nutritional requirements are substantial and damage from malnutrition 
is largely irreversible.
Anthropometry The study and techniques of measuring the human body. Anthropometric 
measurements are often used to compare or classify individuals or population 
groups.
Community-based  
management of acute  
malnutrition 
The management of acute malnutrition through (1) inpatient care for children 
with severe acute malnutrition with medical complications and infants under 6 
months old with visible signs of severe acute malnutrition; (2) outpatient care 
for children with severe acute malnutrition; and (3) community outreach.
Complementary feeding The introduction of other foods and liquids when breast milk alone is no longer 
sufficient to meet the nutritional requirements of infants. The transition from 
exclusive breastfeeding to family foods typically covers the period from 6–24 
months old, even though breastfeeding may continue beyond 2 years old. This 
is a critical period of growth during which nutrient deficiencies and illnesses 
contribute globally to higher rates of undernutrition among children under 5 
years old. Complementary food is any food, whether manufactured or locally 
prepared, given in addition to breast milk (or a breast milk substitute) to satisfy 
the nutritional requirements of the child.
Deworming Periodic drug treatment with an anthelmintic to purge the body of 
soil-transmitted helminths, such as roundworm, whipworm, and hook-
worm. Soil-transmitted helminths impair nutrition status through loss 
of iron and protein, and malabsorption of and competition for nutrients. 
WHO estimates that over 270 million preschool children and over 600 mil-
lion school-age children are living in areas where these parasites are inten-
sively transmitted and in need of treatment and preventive interventions. 
Dietary diversity The number of food groups consumed over a given period of time used as an 
indicator of household food security and diet quality.
Double burden of  
malnutrition (DBM) 
The simultaneous occurrence of undernutrition and overweight or obesity in 
the same community, household, or individual. The DBM is linked to two simul-
taneous global transitions: (1) the nutrition transition, which refers to the shift-
ing dietary consumption and energy expenditures that coincide with economic, 
demographic, and epidemiological changes, such as modernization, urbaniza-
tion, economic development, and increased wealth; and (2) the epidemiological 
transition that accounts for the replacement of infectious diseases by chronic 
diseases over time and refers to the pattern of increased population growth 
rates, due to improved public health, sanitation and disease therapy and treat-
ment, followed by a releveling of population growth, due to subsequent declines 
in fertility rates.
Annex 4  Glossary of Nutrition Terms
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Food security When all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, 
safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life.
Food system A collaborative network that integrates sustainable food production, processing, 
distribution, consumption, and waste management in order to enhance the envi-
ronmental, economic, and social health of a particular place.
Food fortification The addition of one or more micronutrients (vitamins and minerals) to a food 
during processing. Ideally, food fortification provides a public health benefit 
with minimal risks to health in the population. 
Growth monitoring Growth monitoring follows the growth rate of a child in comparison to a stan-
dard by periodic, frequent, anthropometric measurements in order to assess 
growth adequacy and identify faltering early. Growth Monitoring & Promotion 
(GMP) consists of growth monitoring combined with counseling to increase 
awareness of child growth, improve caring practices, and increase demand for 
other nutrition-related services.
Hunger A feeling of discomfort, illness, weakness, or pain due to a prolonged lack of 
food.
Infant and Young Child 
Feeding (IYCF)
Refers to specific recommendations and guiding principles for feeding children 
between birth and 24 months old for optimal nutrition, health, and develop-
ment. A set of eight core population-level indicators31 have been developed to 
assess feeding trends over time; improve targeting of interventions; and moni-
tor progress in achieving goals and evaluating the impact of interventions.  The 
principles include:
• Early initiation of breastfeeding—initiation of breastfeeding within one 
hour of birth. 
• Exclusive breastfeeding for infants under 6 months old—the feeding of an 
infant only with breastmilk from his or her mother or a wet nurse, or ex-
pressed breastmilk, and no other liquids or solids except vitamins, mineral 
supplements, or medicines in drop or syrup form.
• Continued breastfeeding at 1 year—children 12–15 months old who received 
breast milk during the previous day.
• Introduction of solid, semisolid or soft foods—infants 6–8 months old who 
receive solid, semisolid or soft foods.
• Minimum acceptable diet—a composite indicator consisting of both mini-
mum dietary diversity (children 6–23 months old receiving foods from four 
or more food groups) and minimum meal frequency (children 6–23 months 
old receiving solid, semisolid, or soft foods the minimum number of times 
per day or more).
• Consumption of iron-rich or iron-fortified foods—children 6–23 months 
old who receive an iron-rich food or iron-fortified food that is specially de-
signed for infants and young children or a food that is fortified in the home.
31 WHO (World Health Organization). 2008. Indicators for Assessing Infant and Young Child Feeding Practices. Conclusions of a Consensus Meeting held 
November 6–8, 2007. Washington, DC: WHO.
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Intergenerational  
cycle of malnutrition
Also referred to as the undernutrition cycle, a concept that describes how growth 
failure is transmitted across generations through the mother. The theory links un-
dernutrition in the various stages of development: Small adult women are more 
likely to have low-birth-weight babies; children born with a low birth weight are 
more likely to suffer from growth failure during childhood; girls born with a low 
birth weight are more likely to become small adult women; and adolescent girls 
who become pregnant are even more likely to have low-birth-weight babies.
A child born weighing less than 2,500 grams is categorized as having a low birth 
weight. At the population level, the proportion of infants with a low birth weight 
often serves as an indicator of a multifaceted public health problem that includes 
long-term maternal malnutrition, ill health, hard work, and poor health care in 
pregnancy.
Lean or hunger season Refers to the period between planting and harvesting, when food supplies can be-
come scarce. Families may have to sell livestock, farming tools, and other assets to 
pay for food. During this period, poor farmers are at increased risk for malnutrition.
Malnutrition Poor nutritional status caused by deficiency (undernutrition) or excess. 
Commonly used anthropometric measures of nutrition status include: 
• Stunting (chronic malnutrition)—low height for age, defined as more than 
2 standard deviations below the mean of the sex-specific reference data. 
Stunting is the cumulative effect of long-term deficits in food intake, poor 
caring practices, and illness. 
• Wasting (acute malnutrition)—low weight for height, defined as more 
than 2 standard deviations below the mean of the sex-specific reference 
data. Wasting is usually the result of a recent shock, such as lack of calories 
and nutrients or illness, and is strongly linked to mortality. 
• Underweight—low weight for age, defined as more than 2 standard devia-
tions below the mean of the sex-specific reference data.
Other anthropometric indicators are commonly used for program purposes, 
including: 
• MAM (moderate wasting)—weight for height between 2 and 3 standard 
deviations below the mean of sex-specific reference data. 
• AM (severe wasting)—weight for height more than 3 standard deviations 
below the mean of sex-specific reference data. 
• Global acute malnutrition (moderate and severe wasting combined)—
weight for height more than 2 standard deviations below the mean of 
sex-specific reference data. 
• Moderate malnutrition (moderate underweight)—weight for age between 
2 and 3 z-scores below the mean of sex-specific reference data.
• BMI is a measure of body fat, calculated as weight in kilograms (kg) di-
vided by the square of height in meters (m2). Other measures of nutrition 
status are calculated using BMI. Overweight is defined as a BMI between 
25 and 30 kg/m2. Obesity is defined as a BMI of 30 or more. Although BMI 
is a good measure for determining a range of acceptable weights, it does 
not take into consideration some important factors, such as body build, 
the relative contributions of fat, muscle, and bone to weight.
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Micronutrient  
deficiency
• Also referred to as hidden hunger, the lack of one or more micronutrients, 
often caused by disease or lack of access to or consumption of micronutrient-
rich foods such as fruit, vegetables, animal products, and fortified foods. 
Micronutrients are vitamins and minerals that are needed by the body 
in small amounts to produce enzymes, hormones, and other substances 
essential for proper growth and development. Micronutrient deficiencies 
increase the severity and risk of dying from infectious diseases such as 
diarrhea, measles, malaria, and pneumonia. More than two billion people in 
the world are estimated to be deficient in iodine, vitamin A, iron, or zinc. 
Common micronutrient deficiencies include:
• Anemia—the condition of having a hemoglobin concentration below a 
specified cut-off point, which changes according to age, gender, physiological 
status, smoking habits, and the altitude at which the population being assessed 
lives. WHO defines anemia in children under 5 years old and pregnant women 
as a hemoglobin concentration of less than 110g/l at sea level. It is estimated 
that 50 percent of anemia worldwide is due to iron deficiency. Other causes 
of anemia include malaria and other parasitic infections; acute and chronic 
infections that result in inflammation and hemorrhages; deficiencies in other 
vitamins and minerals, especially folate, vitamin B12, and vitamin A; and 
genetically inherited traits, such as thalassemia.  
• Iron deficiency—the most common nutritional deficiency in the world, 
resulting from insufficient iron in the body due to inadequate consumption 
of bioavailable iron, blood loss, or unmet increased iron requirements due 
to infection, pregnancy, rapid growth, dietary habits, or any combination of 
these.
• Iron deficiency anemia—the condition in which a deficiency in iron causes an 
insufficiency of healthy red blood cells. Iron deficiency and iron deficiency 
anemia are associated with fetal and child-growth failure, compromised 
cognitive development in young children, lowered physical activity and 
labor productivity in adults, and increased maternal morbidity and mortality. 
Women and young children are the most vulnerable to iron deficiency anemia, 
which increases the risk of hemorrhage and sepsis during childbirth, and is 
implicated in 20 percent of maternal deaths. Furthermore, children with 
iron deficiency anemia suffer from infections, weakened immunity, learning 
disabilities, impaired physical development, and in severe cases, death.
• Iodine deficiency—the condition resulting when iodine intake falls below 
the recommended level of 100-199g/l, tested through median urinary iodine 
concentraWtion.
• Iodine deficiency disorders—the consequences of iodine deficiency in a 
population that can be prevented by ensuring that the population has an 
adequate intake of iodine. Iodine deficiency disorders can affect children 
at any stage of rapid growth, with the greatest negative effect on cognitive 
development occurring during pregnancy. Symptoms range from mild 
impairment of brain development and subtle degrees of brain damage, goiter, 
hypothyroidism, reproductive disorders (spontaneous abortion, stillbirth, 
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Micronutrient deficiency,
(continued)
hypothyroidism, reproductive disorders (spontaneous abortion, stillbirth, 
congenital abnormalities, and perinatal mortality) to its most severe form, 
cretinism. Iodine deficiency is the primary cause of preventable mental re-
tardation and brain damage in the world
• Vitamin A deficiency—the condition resulting when vitamin A intake falls 
below recommended levels. Vitamin A deficiency may be exacerbated by 
high rates of infection and greatly increases the risk that a child may die from 
diseases such as measles, diarrhea, and acute respiratory infections. It is the 
leading cause of childhood blindness. Vitamin A deficiency compromises 
the immune systems of approximately 40 percent of the developing world’s 
children under 5 years old and leads to the deaths of as many as one million 
young children each year.
• Zinc deficiency—the condition resulting when zinc intake falls below rec-
ommended levels. Zinc deficiency is associated with growth retardation, 
malabsorption syndromes, fetal loss, neonatal death, and congenital abnor-
malities. Zinc supplementation reduces the duration and intensity of diar-
rheal illnesses and reduces clinical disease caused by acute respiratory in-
fections and malaria.
Nutrition education Encompasses a wide range of efforts to improve nutrition outcomes by chang-
ing nutrition practices, including one-to-one counseling and BCC, and leverages 
available communications channels including IEC, social media, and communi-
ty-level education and mobilization.
Nutrition security The ongoing access to a balanced diet, adequate care and feeding practices, a 
safe and clean environment, clean water, and adequate health care (both pre-
ventive and curative) for all people, and the knowledge needed to care for and 
ensure a healthy and active life for all household members.
Nutrition-sensitive Interventions that address the underlying and basic determinants of maternal, 
fetal, and child nutrition and development, including food security; adequate 
caregiving resources at the maternal, household and community levels; and ac-
cess to health services and a safe and hygienic environment, and incorporate 
specific nutrition goals and actions. Nutrition-sensitive programs can serve as 
delivery platforms for nutrition-specific interventions, potentially increasing 
their scale, coverage, and effectiveness. Examples include programs for agri-
culture and food security; SSNs; early childhood development; maternal mental 
health; women’s empowerment; child protection; schooling; WASH; and health 
and family planning services.32
32 Ruel, M.T., Alderman, H., and the Maternal and Child Nutrition  Study Group. 2013. The Lancet series on Maternal and Child Nutrition. Nutrition-sensitive 
interventions and programmes: how can they help to accelerate progress in improving maternal and child nutrition? Vol. 382: 536-551.
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Nutrition-specific Interventions that have an immediate and direct impact on maternal, fetal, 
and child nutrition and development, including adequate food and nutrient 
intake, feeding, caregiving and parenting practices, and low burden of infectious 
diseases. Examples include adolescent, preconception, and maternal health 
and nutrition; maternal dietary or micronutrient supplementation; promotion 
of optimum breastfeeding; complementary feeding and responsive feeding 
practices and stimulation; dietary supplementation; diversification and 
micronutrient supplementation or fortification for children; treatment of SAM; 
disease prevention and management; and nutrition in emergencies.33
Oral rehydration therapy A type of fluid replacement used to prevent or treat dehydration, especially that 
due to diarrhea, which is defined as the passage of three or more loose or liquid 
stools per day or more frequently than is normal for the individual. Diarrhea is 
usually a symptom of gastrointestinal infection, which can be caused by a variety 
of viral and parasitic organisms. Severe diarrhea leads to fluid loss and plays a 
particularly important role in nutrition and growth faltering, because it can lead 
to malabsorption of nutrients and appetite suppression. The adjusted odds of 
stunting at 24 months old increases by 5 percent with each episode of diarrhea 
in the first 24 months of life.
An oral rehydration solution is a liquid electrolyte solution that is used for the 
management of diarrhea among children. It is typically distributed in ready-to-
use sachets that are added to one liter of clean water.
Psychosocial stimulation The maternal-infant bond formed at the beginning of life is essential for cog-
nitive, emotional, and social development later in life. Feeding and other care 
practices provide opportunities for psychosocial stimulation and help to estab-
lish a positive attachment between caregiver and child.
School garden A small plot or plots within school grounds or nearby—typically managed by 
the schoolchildren with the help of parents, teachers and other community 
stakeholders—where a variety of crops are grown for the purpose of learning, 
recreation, and improving diets. Crops commonly include vegetables, fruits, 
legumes, tubers, and nonfood plants including medicinal herbs, spices, and fuel 
material that are grown throughout the year. Sometimes small livestock and fish 
are raised.
Smallholder farmer Marginal and submarginal farm households that own or cultivate typically less 
than two hectares of land. Smallholder farmer households constitute a large 
proportion of the population in the developing world and of households living 
in poverty and hunger.
33 Ruel, M.T., Alderman, H., and the Maternal and Child Nutrition  Study Group. 2013. The Lancet series on Maternal and Child Nutrition. Nutrition-sen-
sitive interventions and programmes: how can they help to accelerate progress in improving maternal and child nutrition? Vol. 382: 536-551.
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Specialized  
nutritious foods
A wide range of foods aimed at improving nutritional intake, including: 
• Fortified blended foods, such as corn soya blend and wheat soya blend. 
• Point-of-use or ready-to-eat foods, commonly lipid-based nutrient 
supplements, such as ready-to-use therapeutic food, which is a high-energy 
and protein-rich food with added electrolytes, vitamins and minerals, 
specifically designed to treat SAM in the rehabilitation phase, and ready-
to-use supplementary food, which is a high-energy nutrition supplement 
particularly suited as a nutritional support in emergency situations or 
in the context of nutritional programs for the prevention or treatment of 
moderate malnutrition and deficiency-related illnesses. Typically oil- or 
peanut-based, ready-to-use foods do not have to be mixed with water and 
are microbiologically safe to enable outpatient use.
• Micronutrient powders (such as multiple micronutrient powder, multiple 
micronutrients, and micronutrient sprinkles) which are tasteless powders 
that come in individual sachets containing the recommended daily intake of 
16 vitamins and minerals for one person. The powders can be sprinkled into 
home-prepared food after cooking or just before eating.  
• High-energy biscuits are wheat-based biscuits that are easy to distribute 
and can improve the level of nutrition in the first days of an emergency when 
cooking facilities are scarce.
Supplementary feeding A direct transfer of food to target households or individuals, most commonly 
PLW and children. The food may be prepared and eaten onsite or given as a dry 
ration to take home. Supplementary feeding is often provided as an incentive for 
participation in public services such as primary health care and education.
Undernourishment When a person’s usual daily food consumption, expressed in terms of dietary 
energy (kcal), is below the energy requirement norm. An undernourished per-
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